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ARTICLE 
INDEPENDENCE WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY: 
THE HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OF EU POLICY 
TOWARD CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN 
ENTRANTS 
James E. Moliterno,* Lucia Berdisová,** Peter Čuroš,*** &             
Ján Mazúr**** 
ABSTRACT 
In the name of judicial independence, a concept whose name is 
nearly magical in its capacity to draw reflexive devotion, the European 
Union (“the Union”) and Council of Europe1 have used their 
bargaining power to impose nearly uniform structural systems on the 
most recent entrants with little regard for their own individual legal 
cultures and social conditions. This strategy ignores the reality that 
nations with the most successful systems of judicial independence, 
including those of “old Europe,” reached their own judicial 
 
* In 2006, I wrote a paper called The Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 1191 (2006), in which I argued that administrative law judges (“ALJs”) 
are not independent in the usual, structural sense. I noted that ALJs have some attributes in 
common with civil law judges, whose job is to apply rather than make law, as common law 
judges do. Since 2006, I have had the opportunity to work on various ethics issues with 
developing judiciaries in Kosovo, Indonesia, Ukraine, and Slovakia. Naturally, I have learned 
more about civil law judging than I could ever have learned by reading about it. These 
experiences have caused me to revisit issues of judicial independence and impartiality in the 
context of European court systems and those that are developing using a mixture of continental 
European, UK, and US models. Thanks to Luke Graham for excellent research and editorial 
assistance.  
** Slovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of State and Law, Bratislava Slovakia and 
University of Trnava Faculty of Law, Trnava Slovakia 
*** University of Pavol Jozef Šafárik Faculty of Law, Košice Slovakia. 
**** Comenius University in Bratislava Faculty of Law, Bratislava Slovakia. 
1. In this Article we discuss the policies of the Council of Europe, which should not be 
confused with the European Council or the Council of the European Union, which are two of 
the seven core institutions of the European Union. The Council of Europe is an international 
organization aiming to uphold human rights, democracy, and rule of law in Europe. It is distinct 
from the European Union and has more member states than the European Union, although its 
organizational scope and competences are far narrower than those of the Union. 
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independence equilibrium points by their own individual paths, some 
of which are not remotely similar to the others. Nonetheless, all have 
had success with judicial independence. Imposing lock-step systems 
has had unfortunate results on some of the new members of the Union. 
Much can be learned as the Union considers its relationships with 
membership aspirants, such as Ukraine and others. 
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I. THE MEANING AND PURPOSE OF JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE 
Scholars often disagree about the quintessential meaning and 
significance of judicial independence and accountability. To avoid any 
confusion at the beginning of this Article, it may be helpful to say what 
the Article is and is not about. Sometimes it is the best to say at the 
beginning “ceci n’est pas une pipe.”2 This Article will not be about the 
manner and form of judicial decision-making3 or about the capacity 
and propriety of a judge considering extra-legal norms.4 It will be about 
the contours of the concept of judicial independence and the specific 
consequences of judicial independence systems that ill-fit their 
country’s legal culture and that lack commensurate measures of 
judicial accountability. 
First, the precise meaning and limitations of judicial 
independence will be discussed. Second, a few systems of judicial 
independence, some successful and some less so, will be described. 
Third, some legal history of Central and Eastern Europe (“CEE”), 
especially Slovakia, will be discussed to set the stage for problems that 
ensued as a result of EU-pressed systems. Fourth, the system pressed 
on nearly all EU aspirants after 2000 will be explained. Fifth, some of 
the dangers that have been realized in Slovakia will be described. In the 
end, we encourage the European Union to be more flexible in helping 
to design judicial independence systems in future post-communist 
aspirant countries that better account for local conditions and legal 
cultures, as well as adopt a flexible approach to current post-communist 
members when they make needed adjustments to their judicial 
independence systems. 
 
2. Rene Magritte, The Treachery of Images (1928). 
3. For interest on this topic, see Lawrence Alexander, Legal Theory and Judicial 
Accountability: A Comment on Seidman, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1601 (1987) (inquiring into whether 
the judge is independent and accountable to decide the case in a morally correct way: “what I 
would say about judicial accountability, the institutional structure of the judiciary, and the 
judicial selection process and criteria is the following: the ultimate problem of law is the conflict 
between getting things settled and getting things settled in a morally correct way. All other 
current debates—such as the debate over the legitimacy of judicial review in a democracy and 
the ancillary debate over interpretive methodology, judicial selection, and tenure—boil down to 
the question of how to resolve this conflict.”). 
4. If interested in this issue, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1988); AHARON 
BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY (2008); ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1985); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979).    
484 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:2 
To understand judicial independence and accountability, we have 
to consider how the other branches of state power can influence 
decision making of particular judges or how the other branches of state 
power can influence the judiciary as a whole, including the process of 
choosing of new judges, setting or diminishing the salaries of judges, 
or the disciplinary proceedings of judges. 
Like most carefully defined concepts, judicial independence 
exists as a matter of degree. In the narrow (and more precise) sense, 
independence is about insulation from interference by the electorate 
and by the elected legislative and executive branches with a judge’s 
decision making. Thought of this way, some judges are more 
independent than others. The phrase “judicial independence” has 
gained such an aura that its mere invocation is enough to end some 
conversations about it: no debate is countenanced of the possibility that 
there can be too much judicial independence. But there can indeed be 
too much judicial independence, and in the absence of sufficient 
accountability, the consequences can be grave. 
There is indeed a “right amount of judicial independence,” as we 
were taught decades ago by Owen Fiss in his work on emerging 
democracies in Latin America.5 The existence of judicial 
accountability in correct measures is no threat to judicial independence. 
Accountability comes, for example, in the form of well-crafted and 
fairly enforced judicial codes of conduct, clear standards for judicial 
explanation of decision rationales, and various reasonable checks on 
judicial selection and finances by other branches of government. 
Impartiality as a judicial trait is often confused with 
independence. Impartiality is about fair-minded, neutral decision-
making. Independence is created primarily by structural aspects of 
government to ensure that state actors are deterred from influencing 
impartial judicial decision-making. Impartiality is created primarily by 
the structure of the dispute resolution process. All judges are in systems 
that foster impartiality; some judges are in structures that foster 
independence, and independence is a matter of degree, always to be 
balanced by the right amount of accountability. Independence is a 
subset of impartiality, isolating only those influences that come from 
the electorate or the political process or the other branches of 
government. The independence subset is not necessary to the role of 
 
5. Owen Fiss, The Right Degree of Independence, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN 
LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 55 (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993). 
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judge (consider US administrative law judges who are meant to be 
impartial but not independent), but is a highly desirable attribute if the 
judge is meant to check the other branches. 
Impartiality is the broader concept, an ability to resolve a dispute 
free of any inappropriate influence, including influence by state actors. 
Independence is only about influence or fear of influence by state 
actors. Many threats to impartiality exist that are not properly classified 
as independence issues. 
Is independence a fundamental attribute of a judge? There are 
competing definitions and classifications regarding independence, and 
even cooperating institutions do not offer a common treatment of the 
concept. In Europe, this somewhat confusing mixture of definitions and 
the systems they generate is clearly visible. On the one hand, levels of 
independence are classified by consultative organizations of the 
Council of Europe (“CoE”) called Consultative Council of European 
Judges (“CCJE”) on statutory, functional and financial bases.6 By 
another institution, European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 
(“CEPEJ”), independence is discussed in terms of being internal and 
external.7 Still another classification system of independence by the 
European Network of Councils of the Judiciary (“ENCJ”), the 
consultative institution of the European Commission, exists on the 
basis of objective independence of the judiciary as a whole, including 
objective independence of the individual judge and subjective 
independence.8 And these contrasting systems for describing 
independence in Europe have produced a wide range of judicial 
independence systems across the pre-2000 members of the European 
Union. 
In the end, what is independence in the judicial sense?9 Properly 
understood, judicial independence is a wonderful thing—an essential 
 
6. Magna Carta of Judges, CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUR. JUDGES (Nov. 17, 2010), 
https://rm.coe.int/16807482c6 [https://perma.cc/MP6Q-A7DT]. 
7. Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of 
Ministers to member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities (Nov. 17, 
2010). 
8. EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS OF THE JUDICIARY, INDEPENDENCE, 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND QUALITY OF THE JUDICIARY (2016-2017), available at 
https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/pdf/workinggroups/independence/encj_report_ia_ga_adopt
ed_ga_13_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTH5-VWWM]. 
9. See generally Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. 
L. REV. 671 (1980); Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean By “Judicial Independence”?, 64 
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thing for a just and prosperous nation. Abused, or improperly 
understood, “judicial independence” is a tool of corruption and 
injustice. 
It is critical to see what judicial independence is and what it is not. 
Judicial independence is meant to empower judges to be just. Judicial 
independence prevents the government from placing its thumb on one 
side of the scales of justice. It prevents the government from interfering 
with a judge’s impartial decision of a case according to the law and the 
facts. But judicial independence is not permission for judges to engage 
in wrongdoing. It is not a defense to the requirement of making 
transparent decisions. It is not an impregnable force-field that prevents 
judges from being accountable for the quality and integrity of their 
judicial work. 
Judges in even the most independent systems in the world are 
charged with crimes when they break the law, when they decide cases 
not on the law and the facts but to favor the interests of themselves, 
their friends, their family, or their colleagues. Judicial independence is 
not permission to be unlawful, nor is it permission to engage in 
arbitrary decision-making behind the gloss of legal forms. 
Judicial independence belongs to the people of a nation, both 
litigants and non-litigants, not to the judges. Judicial independence 
allows the judges to act in impartial ways to do justice for the people 
and businesses of a nation. It is not property of the judges themselves, 
but rather an instrumental concept that favors justice and fair 
application of the law. Independence is the right of the people towards 
the government. Independence and accountability are preconditions for 
trust from the population. When the judiciary is not independent, it can 
lead to an assumption that when legislative or executive power harms 
an individual, the judiciary does not have the power to save the 
individual from these interests. If there is too much independence 
without sufficient accountability, undesirable consequences could lead 
to mistrust in the judiciary because of lack of transparency and 
blindness of whose interest is fulfilled by judicial action. The role of 
judicial independence is to guarantee for all who will become a party 
before a court, that the decision of the court will not be influenced by 
 
OHIO ST. L.J. 323 (2003); Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and 
the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153 
(2003). 
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state powers through the leverage of the appointment or election, 
control of compensation, or assignment of the case to a biased judge. 
Unaccountable independence can have damaging consequences 
as serious as those resulting from a lack of independence from other 
powers or entities. Unaccountable independence fosters secrecy and 
lack of transparency within a judiciary. Secrecy and lack of 
transparency unsurprisingly cause public distrust of the judiciary.  
Properly understood, judicial independence gives people faith in 
justice and confidence in judges. It allows people to know that the 
government will not decide disputes; the law will. It allows people and 
businesses to know that judges are not owned by anyone, that judges 
owe no higher duty than the duty they owe to justice. 
Only in a nation where justice is trusted can people and businesses 
act with confidence and live their lives knowing that the law will 
resolve the inevitable disputes that arise. When people and businesses 
believe in justice, they invest in the future and everyone benefits. 
Without properly understood judicial independence, society 
flounders. People and businesses resolve disputes in dark rooms behind 
closed doors, sometimes by unlawful arrangements. If judges are not 
to be trusted, people think, why should I depend on the law? Why 
should I play by the rules? In such a society, all suffer the 
consequences. Taxes go uncollected and the needy suffer, roads are 
poor, public projects are stymied. 
When reliance on judicial rulings is low, lawyers try to hedge 
extensively and outsource many functions of the judiciary outside of 
the court system. There are at least two types of cost attached to this: 
(1) real costs, related to the fact that some of the most reputable law 
firms in such a system regularly advise their clients to opt for 
arbitration courts to avoid unpredictable and biased decisions. This 
means that costs for even minor business disputes are significantly 
higher than they would otherwise be; and (2) sunk-costs attached to the 
fact that decisions may be unpredictable, biased, lengthy, or 
unprofessional. 
Independence is not a blank check or free pass for a judge to act 
how she pleases. It needs to be balanced by accountability. It is a 
mistake to imagine the relation of the independence and accountability 
as a spectrum such that on the left end would be independence and on 
the right end would be accountability. Such a view would produce 
results such as independence being at 100% and accountability at 0%, 
or independence being at 25%, and accountability at 75%. The relation 
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of accountability and independence is different. Accountability and 
independence do not lay on opposite sides of a spectrum. Instead it is 
more appropriate to imagine it as a coin, where on one side is an 
appropriate amount of independence and on the other there is 
essentially the same amount of accountability. Without having equally 
balancing sides to a single coin, the judiciary, the public cannot believe 
in justice. The public sees judges who do as they please and hide their 
improper motives and act behind a shield of judicial independence. 
A critical problem is the absence of objective criteria by which 
accountability may be measured by the public. Since judges are 
generally not meant to be politically accountable (except, for example, 
in some US states where they are elected), the public has little 
information or capacity by which they may hold judges accountable. 
There are two structural devices that offer the best options for holding 
judges accountable. First, clear codes of conduct, fairly enforced, 
charges under which may be initiated by any member of the public hold 
some promise of increasing accountability. Second, accountability can 
be significantly enhanced by a legal requirement or culture that 
commands judges to clearly and thoroughly explain their decisions in 
writings that are easily accessible to any member of the public. 
To conceptualize judicial independence further, we must 
distinguish between judicial independence on the level of decision 
making of individual cases and judicial independence on the level of 
the whole judiciary and court structure. The former must be understood 
as a value in itself, an elementary precondition of fair trial and 
democratic regimes. It implies freedom to decide cases independently, 
but also to behave independently of any state power.10 It requires 
judges to objectively apply the law to the facts of the case. The latter, 
on the other hand, has a more instrumental and mechanistic nature; we 
refer to structural independence as a means to support and strengthen 
the formal independence. Structures prevent the executive power or 
other powerful actors from encroaching the judiciary and attempting to 
influence individual cases. 
It is normally understood that this threat to independence comes 
from outside of the judiciary; the judiciary was treated as an object of 
attacks and threats. These risks have been seen in efforts to support the 
 
10. Maria Popova, POLITICIZED JUSTICE IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES: A STUDY OF 
COURTS IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE (2012); Samuel Spáč, By the Judges, For the Judges: The 
Study of Judicial Selection in Slovakia (2017) (unpublished dissertation, Comenius University). 
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judiciary by strengthening its independence from potentially-
interfering state actors. In practical terms, these efforts traditionally 
represented a transfer of powers from ministries or other state organs 
to the judiciary. Yet, in the countries this Article focuses on, little 
attention was paid to the possibility that the judiciary itself may very 
well include leading, powerful actors threatening the independence of 
individual courts or judges. The judiciary is not an inanimate object but 
consists of judges with their own minds and interests. A judiciary may 
show tendencies to use its own powers for its own benefit in situations 
where the composition of the branch is rather homogenous, its internal 
structures and members are interrelated and interdependent more on 
each other than on the outside actors, i.e., showing signs of structural 
independence, but internal dependence. As a result of this framework 
threats to independence can “result from the interplay between capacity 
and willingness of powerful actors to threaten independence, and 
resistance of judicial actors to such actions,” where the powerful actors 
may include leading judges or groups of judges.11 The extent to which 
a judiciary is independent is thus contingent not only on the strength of 
threats and attacks from outside, but also on the resistance manifested 
by the judiciary. A judiciary is therefore an actor in its own right; to 
some extent it chooses to be independent, and how to resist threats both 
from without and within. 
II. LONG-STANDING SYSTEMS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
ARE NOT ONE-SIZE FITS ALL 
In nations where judicial independence is properly understood and 
followed, justice is not perfect, but it is expected. Failures of justice 
and corruption are unusual even though they do happen. Decisions are 
made with which some people disagree, and some number of decisions 
may even be incorrectly decided. Independent judges are not punished 
for honest mistakes or for making a decision in a difficult case with 
which some disagree. But they are expected to resist threats to their 
independence so that they may decide cases fairly based on only law 
and fact. 
 
11. Spáč, supra note 10, at 127. 
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A. UNITED STATES 
Even the most independent US judges, which are judges under 
Article III of the US Constitution (“Article III judges”), are not 
completely and literally independent.12 A significant group of judges 
who deliver an enormous amount of justice are not meant to be 
independent at all.13  Despite these less-than-thorough markers of 
independence, the US judiciary is widely regarded as the gold standard 
for judicial independence. “Independence” literally means the absence 
of dependence, which is to say complete autonomy and insusceptibility 
to external guidance, influence, or control. If we think of judicial 
independence in literal terms, however, federal judges are not 
“independent,” at least not as dictionaries define the word. They are not 
autonomous, because Congress retains ultimate control over their 
budget, jurisdiction, structure, size, administration, and rulemaking. 
Moreover, they are susceptible to outside influence; if judges engage 
in behavior (on or off the bench) that the political branches characterize 
as criminal, they may be prosecuted and imprisoned; if they make 
politically unacceptable decisions, the President and Senate may 
decline to appoint them to higher judicial office; if they commit “high 
crimes and misdemeanors,” they may be impeached and removed from 
office; if they make decisions with which higher courts disagree, their 
decisions may be reversed; and if they engage in behavior that judicial 
councils regard as misconduct, they may be disciplined.14 
“Federal judges are thereby rendered autonomous in the limited 
sense that they have an enforceable monopoly over ‘the judicial 
power,’ and are insulated from two discrete forms of influence or 
control, namely, threats to their tenure and salary”15; that is what makes 
Article III judges independent. Why are they not completely 
independent? The answer is that “increased judicial independence is 
not always better.”16 Judicial independence is not an end in itself; it is 
 
12. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 9, at 326–27; Terri Peretti, A Normative Appraisal of 
Social Scientific Knowledge Regarding Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 349 (2003) 
(claiming that “[e]vidence abounds that American judges possess only a modest amount of 
independence”). 
13. James Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1191 (2006). 
14. Geyh, supra note 9, at 159. 
15. Id. 
16. Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 
195, 195 (2003); Fiss, supra note 9. 
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a means to an end.17 It ought to be curtailed when it ceases to be 
conducive to that end.18 
What, then, is the purpose, the end served, of Article III judicial 
independence? While in part, independence enhances impartiality, that 
enhancement is far from the primary purpose of independence. Most 
fundamentally, independence “preserve[s] the integrity of the judiciary 
as a separate branch of government.”19 To be most useful,  individual 
judges should be able to decide cases without being influenced by 
anything other than the facts and the law, and  the judiciary should 
function as a third branch of government and check the other two. 
However, at the same time the judiciary must be restrained from 
running amok and doing whatever it wants. So guarantees of judicial 
tenure and salary should exist, but not guarantees that the entire 
judiciary will be free from any checks from the other branches. The 
best balance employs elements of both independence and 
accountability in the formulation of our federal judiciary. But to make 
the judicial checks on the other branches meaningful, the Article III 
balance is decidedly tilted toward independence and away from 
accountability. 
These formal accountability checks on the courts are almost never 
used, even though they are technically available to Congress,20 perhaps 
because Congress does not want to interfere with judicial 
independence, perhaps for fear of partisan tit-for-tat. There is, 
therefore, a definite “tension” between independence and 
 
17. See Burbank, supra note 13, at 323. 
18. See Geyh, supra note 13, at 163 n.29 (“[T]hat judicial independence is not an end in 
itself, but an instrumental value that serves another end.”) 
19. Id. at 162; see also John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, 
Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 962 (2002) 
(arguing that the end of independence and accountability is “a well-functioning system of 
adjudication”); Cross, supra note 20 (explaining that judicial independence is “freedom from 
control by the other political branches of government”); Elizabeth A. Larkin, Judicial Selection 
Methods: Judicial Independence and Popular Democracy, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 65, 65 (2001) 
(explaining that judicial independence enables courts to “serve as an institutional check on the 
legislative and executive branches and that judicial independence is essential for the judiciary to 
protect the rule of law”) (footnotes omitted); Irving Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial 
Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 691 (1980) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s 
definition of judicial independence has stated as its purpose keeping the judiciary “free from 
undue interference by the President or Congress”); and Irving Kaufman, Chilling Judicial 
Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 713 (1979). 
20. Geyh, supra note 13, at 164. 
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accountability. How can we resolve this tension, keeping judges 
accountable to the other branches while not beholden to them? 
The political branches struck a constitutional balance over time 
between judicial accountability and independence.21 This balance, 
which is represented by customary independence, can be altered by the 
political branches.22 Similarly, the courts may alter the scope of 
doctrinal independence.23 Though doctrinal independence and 
customary independence are bound to constitutional norms, functional 
independence is “shaped by the vagaries of any given day’s public 
policy.”24 This customary independence is not, of course, inviolable. 
However, methods of constraining the judiciary which have 
traditionally been considered antithetical to judicial independence are 
presumptively unconstitutional according to this scheme. Essentially, 
Geyh argued that Congress has refrained from interfering with this 
“customary independence” because it has so interpreted the 
Constitution as to make such interference unconstitutional. Congress 
is, by so doing, exercising self-restraint,25 just as courts occasionally 
do. 
Article III judges, as members of courts made up of several judges 
(e.g., the Supreme Court, the courts of appeal, and the district court 
panels), are themselves the product of a combination of executive and 
legislative choice.26 The selection and confirmation process is a real 
but modest detraction from judicial independence. Although each 
individual Article III judge may be almost entirely insulated from 
legislative and executive oversight once confirmed (there remains only 
the impeachment threat), even they are less than perfectly independent. 
They remain as members of courts the composition of which will be 
influenced by future appointments. Even seeming lone ranger district 
court judges have changing panels of future appellate courts to which 
to look forward. Nonetheless, Article III judges possess the greatest 
measure of independence of any American judges. 
 
21. Id. at 165. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL & HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 141 (2003) (discussing the 1999 choreographed 
exchange between President Clinton and Senator Orrin Hatch, where Senator Hatch agreed to 
move pending judicial nominations through the confirmation process as long as the president 
kept Senator Hatch’s preferred candidate’s name moving through the nomination process). 
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Where does this leave accountability, however, if Congress has 
progressively abandoned the constitutionally permitted methods of 
curbing the courts? Perhaps it lies entirely in the appointment process. 
The appointment process is the only constitutional restraint on the 
judiciary that Congress has shown itself willing to exercise; every other 
method (e.g., adjusting court size, reducing court budgets, and 
impeachment for unfavorable decisions) has been gradually 
abandoned, forming the “customary” independence of Article III 
courts. Therefore, the appointment process stands as the only 
remaining check on Article III independence, which ensures the 
judiciary’s integrity as a third branch of government, allowing it to 
serve as a check on the two others, and which also guarantees its own 
accountability.27 
But the formal accountability systems are not actually the chief 
form of judicial accountability in US-style systems. Instead, a large 
measure of accountability derives from the tradition of explaining 
judicial decisions thoroughly, in writing, and in documents that are 
easily accessible to the legal community, the media, and indeed any 
member of the public. The process of explanation of rationale connects 
judicial decisions with public discourse. First, the judge who must 
explain her decision is a judge who will decide more carefully and with 
greater focus on accuracy. Second, the legal community, especially the 
academic legal community, can engage the quality and reasoning of 
decisions that are explained in writing. Third, the media and the general 
public, sometimes informed by media, are enabled to apply and express 
the public will regarding the rationale and reasoning of the judge. In 
ordinary life, people are more likely to accept and respect a decision 
that affects them if the decision-maker has been willing to explain 
himself. Some credit is given to the good-will of a decision-maker (an 
employment supervisor, a parent, a legal authority) when an 
explanation accompanies a decision. People may still disagree with the 
decision, but they pay greater respect to it when it is thoroughly 
explained. This form of accountability is tangible and a well-engrained 
part of the US culture, applying to both federal and state judges, 
including administrative judges. 
 
27. Whether or not reducing congressional control of the judiciary entirely to the 
appointment process does in fact maintain judicial accountability is not at issue here; we are 
only concerned with the principles behind the facts, not the facts themselves. 
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Some would say that this judicial decision-making attribute is 
uniquely a common law system one. But that is not accurate. Civil 
codes describing the document to be produced by a deciding judge 
articulate the necessity of a “reasoning” or “rationale” section in the 
judgment document. Too often, this section is treated in a highly 
formalistic way, with a simple rendition of the governing articles of the 
code that were applied by the judge. But there is nothing that would 
prevent civil law judges from actually providing written reasoning or 
rationale in such a section of their judgments. Doing so would enhance 
both accountability and, over time, public trust. 
Many state court judges have a high degree of independence from 
the legislative and executive, but less than that of Article III judges. 
State judges lack life tenure and perfect protection against 
compensation reduction. State court judicial selection and renewal 
processes result in structures less friendly to independence than those 
of Article III judges. Elected state judges have significant 
independence from the legislative and executive but must answer to the 
electorate and have a lower measure of independence from the people 
as a result. To be sure, in many states, terms are long28 and re-election 
processes so substantially favor incumbents that this reduction from 
life tenure may in practice be modest. But it exists to some measure in 
all instances. Given the new freedom to campaign in judicial 
elections,29 independence from the electorate is likely to diminish 
further for elected judges. Appointed state judges begin with some form 
of the same input from the other branches, like Article III judges, but 
their renewal processes substantially decrease their once-appointed 
independence. These judges must stand for reappointment by either the 
executive or the legislative branches periodically and risk termination 
when they act in ways that displease the branch that considers their 
renewal. While appointed judges are less beholden to the electorate 
than elected judges, they remain just a step removed: the branch that 
renews judges is itself subject to the winds of electoral change. 
 
28. See Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. 1147, 1156 (1993); Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice 
and the Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1435 (2003); Paul M. Bator, The 
State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 630 (1981). 
For information on state judicial term limits, see 37 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 318-21, tbl. 5.6 
(2005) (including examples of long terms for state judges such as 14-year initial terms for trial 
level judges in New York, 12-year terms in Delaware, and 10-year terms in Pennsylvania). 
29. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 
F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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There are two sets of system attributes that support independence. 
One is structural and the other relational. Both are necessary 
ingredients of success independence systems. 
One set is structural. Federal judges are selected through a process 
that involves both of the other branches; they have life tenure; and their 
salary cannot be reduced. However, state judges live in a system that is 
less structurally friendly to independence. Many are elected; some are 
selected by legislatures; most are closer to the political process for one 
reason or another; and their court budgets are subject to local political 
contests. When these structural attributes are present, as they are in the 
federal judicial system, they tend to foster independence from 
interference by the other branches. 
The other set is largely relational rather than structural. Judges are 
insulated from most ex parte communication; they are not to be the 
recipient of extravagant gifts; and they must monitor their outside 
interests. These rules are largely meant to foster judicial independence 
from inappropriate influence by the parties to litigation or others 
interested in the outcome of litigation. This set of attributes might more 
accurately be said to foster impartiality more than they foster 
independence. 
In some sense, independence is a personal trait. Structures can 
foster it or not. On some level, however, judges are or are not 
independent because of their personal qualities. State judges might act 
independently of political influence from the other branches and of the 
electorate, even though structures do not lend support to such conduct. 
Such judges run the risk of being ex-judges, and when that occurs, the 
structures have won. In any event, even judges of independent spirit 
and inclination are not independent in the judicial sense when their 
decisions are subject to direct, de novo review. 
Independence is not an essential attribute of judging. While many 
state court judges may function with high levels of independence, 
structures to foster high levels of independence are not in place in most 
states. One can only conclude that state government founders did not 
regard judicial independence with the same regard as did federal 
government founders. Independence, at least the structural 
independence from interference from the other branches, is most 
important when the judiciary is expected to function in a counter-
majoritarian manner. 
Therefore, even within the United States, judges function with 
impartiality and quality even though the systems for ensuring their 
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independence vary quite substantially between federal and state judges. 
Systems also differ widely from state to state at that level. Judicial 
independence systems are not one-size fits all, even within the United 
States 
B. Judicial Independence in Western Europe and “Old” European 
Union Member States 
Several international organizations have developed standards to 
help states understand what it means for a judicial system to be 
independent.30 The standards produced by these international 
organizations focus on certain structural characteristics.31 They 
consider, for example, the degree of separation between the judiciary 
and the other branches of government, the judiciary’s involvement in 
its own administrative oversight, and the amount of individual 
authority judges have to decide cases freely.32 
Although international standards are helpful in analyzing the 
independence of a state’s judiciary, applying general standards across 
Europe should be done with caution. Judicial independence is practiced 
differently across the continent because its development is heavily 
influenced by each state’s unique cultural and legal history.33 It is 
therefore helpful to discuss judicial independence by taking a look at 
how the concept has developed regionally instead of looking at Europe 
as a whole. Particularly, how judicial independence has played out in 
Western Europe and other European Union member states as compared 
to its development in CEE. 
There are different models of safeguarding judicial independence 
across Europe.34 For example, in Spain, there is the judicial council, 
 
30. OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, MONITORING THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS: JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE 17, 26–31 (Cent. Eur. Univ. Press 2001) (citing several sources of standards of 
judicial independence including the EU, ECHR jurisprudence and other international 
organizations). 
31. Id. at 27. 
32. Id. 
33. John Adenitire, Judicial Independence in Europe: The Swedish, Italian and German 
Perspectives 3 (2012) (unpublished manuscript). 
34. As CoE mentions, “The aim of this Opinion is to identify the core elements in relation 
to the general mission, composition and functions of the Council for the Judiciary with a view 
to strengthening democracy and to protecting the independence of the judiciary. The Opinion 
does not present a detailed description of principles for the composition or the functions of the 
Council for the Judiciary, neither does it create a single model for the Council for the Judiciary 
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which is independent to a large extend, not entirely unlike those 
currently in CEE. The Spanish judiciary is seen as somewhat isolated 
from the rest of the state.35 By contrast, the German model features 
more control by the Ministry of Justice.36 In general, member states in 
the south adopted judicial councils that have powers over appointment 
and evaluation of judges. Northern member states tend to have judicial 
councils that have power over budgets and management of the 
judiciary. In essence, the CoE proposed a model for new entrants that 
would combine the Southern European model with the Northern 
European model.37 Combining the functions created exceptionally 
powerful judicial councils in post-communist EU entrants. 
Judicial independence was adopted among “old” EU member 
states as a response to historical and cultural events that changed the 
states’ outlook on the role of the judiciary. In some states, judicial 
independence developed as a reaction to the increasing role law was 
playing as a tool to limit government power.38 For example, England, 
in response to James II’s attempts to remove judges and intimidate 
bishops, increased the independence of the judiciary by preventing 
Parliament from removing judges without good cause.39 In other 
Western European countries, the idea of judicial independence 
developed as a reaction to previous totalitarian rule. Both Spain and 
 
in Europe.” See also CCJE, Opinion no.10 (2007) of the Consultative Council of European 
Judges (CCJE) to the attention of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the 
Council for the Judiciary at the service of society (adopted 21-23 November 2007). 
35. Mauro Cappelletti, Who Watches the Watchmen? A Comparative Study of Judicial 
Responsibility, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 550, 556 (Shimon 
Shetreet & Jules Deschênes eds., 1985) (“The result is a system of what I would call, 
exaggerating somewhat perhaps, individual anarchy: not only is the judiciary, to a large extent, 
a corps séparé, but even every individual judge is almost like a monad which has its own separate 
existence, largely aloof from internal, as well as external, controls. To be sure, this system might 
still be less fearful than one of dependency from the political power; it is not, however, 
necessarily less damaging.”); See also Michal Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence 
and the Mental Transitions of the Central European Judiciaries, 14 EUR. PUB. L. 99 (2008) 
[hereinafter Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence]. 
36. Michal Bobek & David Kosař, “Euro-products” and Institutional Reform, in 
CENTRAL EUROPEAN JUDGES UNDER THE EUROPEAN INFLUENCE: THE TRANSFORMATIVE 
POWER OF EU REVISITED 183 (Michal Bobek ed., 2015). 
37. CCJE, Opinion no. 10 ¶ 46. 
38. Anja Seibert-Fohr, European Comparatives on the Rule of Law and Independent 
Courts 2 (Nov. 9, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1652598 [https://perma.cc/DG49-Z425]. 
39. Robert Stevens, The Independence of the Judiciary: The Case of England, 72 CAL. L. 
REV. 597, 599 (1999). 
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Italy, for example, developed strong, autonomous judiciaries after the 
fall of fascism in Italy and the end of Francisco Franco’s reign in 
Spain.40 
The differences in the origin of judicial independence have 
produced varying judicial structures and degrees of independence 
across Europe. Although each judicial system found in Western Europe 
is different, they each face the same challenges that attempting to 
maintain an independent judiciary presents. A common problem 
among these states is finding a proper balance between independence 
and accountability. Other states struggle with maintaining separation 
between the judiciary and other political branches. 
Three examples follow. Each system example is based on 
historical differences in legal culture and governance systems. 
Collectively, the examples demonstrate that there is no single formula 
for judicial independence and successful systems must be designed 
with local factors in mind.  
1. Judicial Independence in Sweden 
In Sweden, the requirement of an independent judiciary is 
codified in their constitution: “Neither the Parliament, nor a public 
authority, may determine how a court of law shall adjudicate an 
individual case or otherwise apply a rule of law in a particular case. 
Nor may any other public authority determine how judicial 
responsibilities shall be distributed among individual judges.”41 
In order to maintain independence, threats of violence to public 
officials and bribery are criminalized.42 Sweden’s Constitution secures 
tenure of permanent salaried judges. These judges may only be 
removed if they reach the age of retirement or “are shown to be 
manifestly unfit to hold office . . . .”43 Sweden has balanced the need 
for independence with judicial accountability through a number of 
mechanisms. For example, judges are not immune from civil or 
criminal liability and can be prosecuted for taking bribes.44 
 
 40. Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence, supra note 35. 
41. REGERINGSFORMEN (RF) [CONSTITUTION] 11:3 (Swed.). 
42. Adenitire, supra note 33, at 7. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
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Although the Swedish judiciary does maintain a degree of 
independence, their judicial structure leaves them vulnerable to 
political and executive influence. The executive branch controls the 
appointment of judges to permanent positions. As a result, associate 
judges often work in governmental departments to increase their 
chances of being appointed to a permanent position.45 Further, because 
there is no established independent legal service for the government, 
permanent judges are brought in to provide legal advice to the 
executive branch, clearly blurring the separation between the judiciary 
and the executive.46 
Sweden’s judicial structure is also vulnerable to undue political 
influence. In Sweden, judicial panels are made up a mix between lay 
judges and permanent judges.47 In all criminal cases and family law 
cases, for example, the panel of judges consists of three lay judges and 
one permanent judge, each having one vote.48 Lay judges are elected 
by political parties and serve a term of four years. The fact that political 
representatives and judges sit on the same panel to adjudicate cases 
greatly undermines the judiciary’s independence from politics. 
2. Judicial Independence in Italy 
Italy’s judiciary is extremely independent, perhaps to a fault. 
Italy’s Constitution states that “[t]he judiciary . . . [constitutes an] 
autonomous and independent . . .” branch of government not subject to 
any other.49 Among civil law countries, Italy is ranked as one of the 
highest in terms of protections established to ensure judicial 
independence.50 In order to ensure judicial autonomy, the judicial 
system is exclusively run by an independent judicial council called the 
Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura (“CSM”). Similar councils are 
found in France, Spain, and Portugal. The CSM is made up of judges 
and has complete managerial control over the employment, 
 
45. Id. at 8. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 9 (If the case is taken to the Court of Appeal, the panel is comprised of three 
permanent judges and two lay judges). 
48. Id. 
49. Art. 104(1) Constituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
50. Giuseppe Di Federico, Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary in Italy: The 
Experience of a Former Transitional Country in a Comparative Perspective, JUD. INTEGRITY 2 
(Andras Sayo ed.) (This is a modified version of the original article.). 
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assignments, and discipline of judges and prosecutors.51 Accountability 
is reached in the same ways it is reached in Sweden. Italian judges can 
be held criminally and civilly liable but cannot be punished for their 
interpretations of the law.52 
Italy has a strong, independent judiciary, but this independence 
has been achieved at the cost of efficiency and accountability.53 To 
increase judicial independence, evaluations of a judge’s performance 
have been eliminated.54 The CSM has also put policies in place to 
minimize outside supervision of judges.55 As a result of this lack of 
oversight, Italy’s judicial system is highly inefficient. In fact, Italy has 
received by far the most monetary sanctions for failing to conclude 
judicial proceedings in a reasonable time.56 Italy is therefore a prime 
example of a state that has revised their judicial structure in a way that 
concentrates on judicial independence but disregards programs that 
favor accountability.57 
3. Judicial Independence in England 
England has what some consider the “hallmarks” of an 
independent judiciary.58 Judges in England are afforded “security of 
tenure, fiscal independence, impartiality and freedom from executive 
[power].”59 Unlike other countries in Europe, England’s judicial 
independence seems to be held in place by natural forces. For example, 
the Lord Chancellor is not only the Head of the Judiciary but a 
politician who serves in a major executive department.60 However, this 
relationship does not appear to be problematic. Also, judicial 
impartiality seems to be maintained simply by “[t]he formality of 
English law, a relatively small bar, a divided profession, and the orality 
of English courtroom procedure.”61 
 
51. See Adenitire, supra note 33, at 14. 
52. Id. at 15. 
53. Seibert-Fohr, supra note 38, at 9. 
54. Di Federico, supra note 50, at 9. 
55. Id. at 10. 
56. Id. 
57. See id. at 9-10 
58. Stevens, supra note 39, at 599. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 605-06. 
61. Id. at 604. 
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On a structural level, the English judiciary is not a co-equal branch 
of government, as is the case in the United States.62 The English 
Constitution states that the judiciary is subordinate to Parliament.63 
Parliament has the ability to make or end law and no future court 
decision can change an existing law.64 This type of relationship 
between Parliament and the judiciary may limit the decision-making 
ability of the judiciary.65 On its face, this type of structure appears to 
be similar to the structure found in communist countries, where the 
government takes most if not all of the decision-making power away 
from the judiciary.66 However, in classic Parliamentary systems, as in 
England and France, this dominant relationship does not exist. 
Members of Parliament are popularly elected and contribute a range of 
opinions, eliminating the risk that the judiciary is only attempting to 
please a single party.67 
Despite England’s success at maintaining an independent 
judiciary, they also have encountered several problems. In recent years, 
there has been pressure on the government to create a more accountable 
judicial system.68 An increase in the demand for accountability has 
been a result of increasing prevalence of judicial review and judicial 
interference. There has also been a concern over the lack of women and 
minorities in the judiciary, leading to allegations of bias appointment 
procedures and a lack of impartiality.69 As a result of these allegations, 
radical reforms have taken place in England over the past decade. 
Reforms included an act which abolished the Lord Chancellor position 
and created a Judicial Appointments Commission which appoints 
judges solely on the basis of merit.70 
 
62. Id. at 608. 
63. Cristina E. Parau, Beyond Judicial Independence: What Kind of Judiciary is Emerging 
in Post-Communist Eastern Europe? 4–5 (Dec. 10, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1523285 [https://perma.cc/J6MU-DVGE]. 
64. Parliamentary Sovereignty, WWW.PARLIAMENT.UK http://www.parliament.uk/about/
how/sovereignty/ [https://perma.cc/ZA8N-6VTA]. 
65. Parau, supra note 63, at 7. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 8. 
68. Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and 
Judicial Independence, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 103, 116 (2009). 
69. Id. at 117. 
70. Id. 
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C. China 
China presents a contrasting example. Exploring its system assists 
in two ways. This exploration enhances understanding of judicial 
independence itself. And second, it illustrates the likely motivations of 
the European Union and CoE when considering the judicial 
independence system, it would insist upon for post-communist 
aspirants in CEE. 
In China, there is essentially no judicial independence from state 
actors. The same was true in the Soviet Union and to varying degrees 
in the communist times in CEE.71 The lack of judicial independence 
results from the application of law: both the law on judges and the law 
on advocates assigns the highest duty of the lawyer or judge to the state, 
in essence to the Communist Party of China.72 Most judges, even 
judges of the high courts, are not law-trained, but instead are state 
actors who have risen through Party ranks or former military officers. 
Their primary function is not to get the law right or do justice in a broad 
meaning of that word, but to serve the paramount interests of the state 
in deciding cases. This very simple structural feature creates a judicial 
system lacking in independence from state actors. Such a system also 
lacks any real accountability to the people of the country, but it ensures 
the highest level of accountability to the state itself. Judges can be fined 
or otherwise punished for making incorrect decisions (that is, decisions 
reversed by higher courts). This last feature encourages conformity and 
devotion to superiors. 
It is well understood that in cases involving the state, at least cases 
of some note or controversy, the judge is subject to the control of party 
officials who “stand behind the curtain” in the courtroom. Ordinary 
criminal defense lawyers in such cases operate as technicians, merely 
ensuring that the proper process is followed, and restraining the 
enthusiasm of their objections when procedure is not followed. 
Ironically, and perhaps in a tribute to the never-ending 
imagination of lawyers, the lack of meaningful judicial independence 
in China has recently resulted in a fascinating technique now in use by 
 
71.  James Moliterno, The New-Breed, “Die-Hard” Chinese Lawyer: A Comparison with 
American Civil Rights Cause Lawyers, 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. (forthcoming 
2018). 
72.  Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó lǜshī fǎ (yīngwén bǎn) [Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Lawyers], SINA, http://blog.sina.cn/dpool/blog/s/blog_634a1ecb0100sp3g.html 
[https://perma.cc/BZ67-VKFH]. 
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an aggressive sliver of the criminal defense and civil rights bar. A new 
breed of lawyer is practicing criminal defense in China. Dubbed the 
“die-hard lawyer” by the press, but sometimes self-eschewing the label, 
these new lawyers say they are simply representing their clients 
zealously, advancing their interests by whatever legitimate means are 
at hand. What is being said of them in the press?73 What do they say 
about themselves?74 
The die-hard lawyer is certainly more aggressive in the first 
instance. He or she does all that the technically-oriented traditional 
lawyer does, but also vigorously pursues arguments about the legality 
of the prosecution’s evidence and methods. The die-hard lawyer 
challenges judges’ rulings on evidence admission and procedural rights 
and does so vociferously. And the die-hard lawyer does so even after it 
is clear that the judge will not be permitted by others to rule in the 
defense’s favor. But in addition to being more aggressive and more 
persistent, the die-hard lawyer uses tactics that are outside the walls of 
the courtroom and its procedures. 
In particular, the die-hard lawyer uses social media as a tool of 
advocacy, trying to create social pressure on the Party officials who 
control the judges. During the Li Qinghong trial, an “all-star team” of 
defense lawyers blanketed the Chinese social media with news of the 
proceedings, commenting on everything from errors in the indictments 
to the disparate volume of the defense and prosecution microphones.75 
The media work was so intense that weibo (the Chinese version of 
Facebook and Twitter, which are banned in China) updates were being 
sent live from the courtroom by defense lawyers, and large segments 
of the population were riveted to the news. 
[L]awyers’ online activities can be traced back to the influential 
case of Li Zhuang, a lawyer falsely prosecuted with perjury in 
Chongqing, in 2010. While the voices of the official media 
framing and blaming Li were dominating public opinion, the 
 
73.  Alexa Olesen, Meet China’s Swaggering, ‘Diehard’ Criminal Lawyers, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (May 16, 2014), https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/16/meet-chinas-swaggering-diehard-
criminal-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/PP44-3S66]; Yueran Zhang, China’s All-Star Legal Team 
Pleads for Defendants’ Rights on Social Media, TEALEAFNATION (July 25, 2012), 
http://tealeafnation.com/2012/07/bilingual-brew-chinas-all-star-legal-team-pleads-for- 
defendants-rights-on-social-media [hereinafter All-Star Team]. 
74.  In July 2014, Professor Moliterno met and interviewed two of the more prominent new 
breed of Chinese lawyers. 
75.  All-Star Team, supra note 72. 
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defense had no choice but to tell the other side of the story via 
social media.76 
The Chinese die-hard lawyer’s use of social media is an effort to 
combat raw power of those in control of the justice system, both judges 
and so-called “higher-ups.” This use of social media to create public 
pressure and possible embarrassment of “higher ups” seems odd to 
some Americans, simply because such a technique would be so 
unlikely of success in the U.S. Ironically, it is the lack of judicial 
independence in China that makes the technique viable. The well-
founded expectation of Chinese criminal defense lawyers in high 
profile cases is that judges are told what to do by people often referred 
to as “higher ups.” These “higher ups” are party officials whose will is 
being done by local judges and prosecutors. Such orders, while not 
entirely unheard-of in an independent court system, are both rare and 
most likely ineffectual. In such an independent court system, nothing 
much would be gained in an individual case by generating public 
opinion. But the taste of the Chinese public seems to have been whetted 
for news of injustice, and the “higher ups,” while they wield mostly 
unchecked power, do care about stirring the public ire. This is just the 
trend and tendency that is being banked on by the die-hard lawyer in 
the use of social media. The same phenomenon allows, but does not 
ensure, that they will stay out of jail. 
The battle has been joined between the die-hard lawyers and the 
state. “These activist lawyers, who have wild intentions to challenge 
and change the law, have deviated from what their jobs are supposed 
to entail,” a state-oriented editorial said. The editorial leveled a warning 
at the group, who must “realize that they are not commandos or the 
authoritative forces behind improvements to rule of law in China.”77 
Such challenges seem only to further embolden the die-hards and their 
followers. A crackdown on July 9, 2015 (referred to as “709” by 
activists as a sort of code in their social media communications) has 
seriously undermined the strategy and restored the upper-hand to the 
Party. 
For purposes of this article, the important point is that to be 
effective at enhancing or destroying judicial independence, systems 
must be designed with the legal culture in mind, with the attributes of 
 
76.  All-Star Team, supra note 72. 
77.  Shan Renping, Legal Activists Must Also Respect Rule of Law, GLOBAL TIMES (May 
8, 2014), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/859107.shtml [https://perma.cc/6DJX-U482]. 
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the judges and lawyers in mind, and with attention to the balance 
between independence and accountability. If one were to imagine a 
hypothetical reform of the Chinese judicial system intended to move it 
toward democratic principles and norms, it would be natural for such a 
reform to over-emphasize judicial independence at the expense of 
accountability. At first glance, a post-communist judiciary needs more 
independence and less accountability (at least to state actors). This 
appears to have been the mindset of EU CoE accession officials in 
dealing with post-communist aspirant countries. 
III. SOME BACKGROUND LEGAL HISTORY OF CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE (LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR WHY 
THE EU-IMPOSED MODEL OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE WAS 
SUCH A POOR FIT) 
Much debate rages on what is meant by Central or Eastern Europe. 
For this paper, the judicial independence concepts apply generally to 
all post-communist EU entrants and aspirants. But the need to focus 
forces a narrower approach. As a result, in particular, our attention is 
on Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia (collectively, the 
“Visegrad countries”). Their commonalities make them worthy of 
common consideration and study. Before 1989, these four countries 
were a part of the Eastern Bloc; after the Revolution, they became so 
called post-soviet republics. By 2004, they became NATO and EU 
members. The Visegrad countries have much in common because huge 
political events of the twentieth century struck usually all of them 
together. Finally, because of our specialized knowledge and 
experience, we will focus on Slovakia more carefully as our example. 
The results of strengthening judicial independence in the Visegrad 
countries by Council of Europe and European Commission was not 
what these organization might have expected in post-communist 
countries of CEE. 
Browsing through texts dealing with the judicial method and 
mentality in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) at the onset of the 
2004 enlargement of the European Union(EU), one acquired 
a mixed feeling. The mandatory institutional optimism of the 
various approximation and pre-accession reports stood in contrast 
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with rather skeptical tones voiced in some of the scholarly 
writings.78 
On the one hand, the CEE countries adopted laws that strengthen 
the position of the judiciary and putting it into the position of an 
independent branch of state power; but, on the other hand, judges in 
these countries have never overcome the formalistic approach to law, 
(characterized as textualism) which does not comply with recent 
adjustments to the traditional European approach. By “recent” 
European approach, we primarily mean the functioning of the 
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, 
both of which operate partially as common law courts. In other 
respects, the Visegrad tendency toward formalism and textualism is not 
much different from that in other civil law countries in continental 
Europe. 
Their world of formalist, textualist, hyper-positivistic law stood 
worlds apart from the more dynamic and purpose-oriented reasoning 
style required by European law. 79 It became clear that independence is 
not only about structural, institutional separation, but mostly about an 
attitude of all judges or politicians toward an independent judiciary. 
This mental, attitudinal transition from formalism under the 
control of state actors to a more flexible, purpose-driven judging did 
not happen. Changes to legislation in the CEE focused on the formal 
institutional framework but underestimated the personnel at the courts. 
Problems that are simple to solve on paper, by adopting legislation that 
would set the structure of the new regime, proved far more challenging 
to solve in reality because of the existing ideology, reasoning, and 
conviction of nearly all of the judges in the system. “The area of 
genuinely important change, the mental transition of the Central 
European judiciary from a caste of secure and subservient civil servants 
to personally and mentally independent and critical judges who are 
ready to make and (publicly) defend their opinions, has mostly been 
outside of the mainstream focus.”80 
 
78.  MICHAL BOBEK, Revisiting the Transformative Power of Europe, in CENTRAL 
EUROPEAN JUDGES UNDER THE INFLUENCE: TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF THE EU REVISITED 
13 (Hart Publishing 2015). 
79.  Id. at 14 (‘“We shall overcome with the help from Europe’ rhetoric became intertwined 
with scary images of CEE post-Communist judges that were depicted as limited formalists who 
seek refuge in the realms of mechanical jurisprudence and senseless sticking to procedures. 
Afraid to decide on substance and to pass any controversial judgments, they seek to dispose of 
cases on obscure points of procedure, in the observance of which they are very meticulous.”). 
80.  Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence, supra note 35, at 100. 
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An authoritarian regime is like a refrigerator. It can slow down all 
the processes in the society. But when the refrigerator stops working, 
everything starts to rot much faster. CEE was not ready for such 
a dramatic change from a judiciary totally dependent on instruction and 
control from the state to a judiciary almost entirely independent of state 
or public oversight. Of course, how could the states be ready for 
judicial independence when the judges’ entire experience had been in 
a system that required all political activities to conform to the interests 
of the communist party? 
A. History of Judiciary of CEE Countries 
As demonstrated by the previous discussions of European judicial 
independence systems, the local legal culture and history of 
government systems assist an evaluation of what judicial independence 
system may be most successful. To understand the difficulties of the 
180-degree swing from total dependency of judicial power on 
government in authoritarian regime to excessive independence 
according to the model proposed by the organizations of the CoE and 
the EU, it is helpful to have background on roots and legal traditions in 
CEE. Without the background, proposed solutions will lack grounding 
and context. 
Before 1918, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were 
a part of Austro-Hungarian Empire.81 After World War I, the Austrian 
and Hungarian law were adopted by the newborn legal systems in 
Czechoslovakia.82 Of course, the old systems had to be adjusted to fit 
the post-war, post-monarchy democratic institutions.83 Although the 
Austrian and Hungarian Law was condemned as “foreign,” legal 
culture was highly honored by lawyers until the communist coup in 
1948.84 The monarchy developed a complex system of bureaucracy, an 
 
81.  As were small parts of Poland. 
82.  In Czechoslovakia it was adopted by Act. No. 11/1918 Coll. The situation was very 
particular, because of two different legal systems in two parts of the country. In Czech, part of 
the Austrian laws from before 1918 were adopted, and in Slovakia the Hungarian laws from 
before 1918 were adopted. This dualism was not solved until the communist coup in 1948. 
83.  A notoriously famous quote of the first president of the Czechoslovak Republic, 
Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, explains a lot: “Now we have a democracy, what we also need are 
democrats.” 
84.  Paradoxically, it is now the 100th anniversary of the event when we stood at the 
crossroad of history, facing the problem of adopting a framework for institutions that we were 
not familiar with. 
508 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:2 
independent judiciary and sophisticated legal culture. The successor 
states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire inherited from the bureaucratic 
Habsburg State a deep confidence in written law.85 Members of the 
judiciary were traditionally a privileged group. In 1918, this privilege 
is demonstrated in a matter of the location of the Supreme Court when 
Prague was initially designated as the home of Supreme Court, but 
Brno (the second largest town in the central part and much nearer to 
Vienna) became its location. At first blush, it might appear that the 
Czechoslovak legislature wanted to secure the independence of the 
court by moving it out of the capital, Prague; but the real reason for this 
move was that judges who served in Vienna until 1918 and who were 
of Czech origin did not want to move to Prague, which was far away 
from Vienna.86 
Because of the different timeline in all of the CEE countries, we 
focus on Czechoslovakia as the example to explain the position of the 
judiciary in the authoritarian regime. During WWII, Czechoslovakia 
lost many judges. Some were lost because they were Jewish and were 
either taken away by Nazi occupiers or fled. Others left the judiciary 
because their beliefs could not be conformed to the requirements of 
being a judge in a fascist state.87 Following World War II, 
Czechoslovakia went from one authoritarian regime under the 
occupation of Nazi Germany to another, only changing the occupier to 
the Soviet Union. Under the influence of the Soviet laws, new 
institutions were adopted, such as non-law-trained people as judges,88 
retribution courts were established,89 and the qualification of the judge 
 
85.  ZDENĚK KÜHN, THE JUDICIARY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: MECHANICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE IN TRANSFORMATION 4, 9 (2011) (“Czechoslovak judges, despite the 
prevailing atmosphere that was generally hostile to the old Empire gave high praise to the 
distinguished legal culture, independence and efficiency of the Austrian judiciary.”) 
86.  In Act No. 5/1918 Coll., which created the Supreme Court, Prague is claimed to be the 
residence of the Court. See Otakar Motejl, Soudnictví a jeho správa [Judiciary in Communism 
and Its Administration], in KOMUNISTICKÉ PARVO V ČESKOSLOVENSKU [COMMUNIST LAW IN 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA] 813 (Michal Bobek et al. eds., 2009). 
87.  Id. at 814. 
88.  Until 1948 it was common in Czechoslovakia to have jury trials in criminal 
proceedings as the lay instrument. 
89.  Act on Popularization of the Judiciary, Act No. 319/1948 Coll. As the Act on the 
Popularization of the Judiciary was adopted in 1948, the composition of the Supreme Court was 
completed by appointing a required number of lay judges. The panels were made up of two 
professional judges and three lay judges. See Kühn, supra note 85, at 32. 
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became devotion and loyalty to the state.90 When deciding a case, their 
votes were equal. The lay judges even took part in decisions on 
complaints of the violation of law. Because the lay judges were 
appointed by the government, the principles of impartiality and 
independence were seriously violated. The first obligation of the courts 
was to acquire political and ideological character in order to protect the 
socialistic state, socialistic society and relations to the world socialistic 
structure.91 
The early 1950s are notoriously known for the “Monster trials”92 
and also for a huge crisis of the judiciary. After WWII, Czechoslovakia 
lost one-third of the educated elite.93 Popular lay-judges were either 
illiterate or political fanatics.94 Even though there were some judges 
who finished regular law schools in Prague or Bratislava, the 
administration of the courts was always in hands of the nominees of the 
Party. The judiciary in this period was strongly politicized. The 
selection of new judges was also under political influence,95 because of 
 
90.  An application to the Communist Party could prove this devotion. In 1949, the Labour 
Schools of Law were opened and the loyalty to the Communist Party with the “right” political 
attitude became a stronger requirement than the competence of the judge. 
91.  Act on Popularization of the Judiciary, supra note 89, at ¶ 11. 
92.  Political trials: Also known as “Show Trials”– the political trials in which the judicial 
authorities have already determined the guilt of the defendant in advance. The actual trial has as 
its only goal to present the accusation and the verdict to the public as an impressive example and 
as a warning to other would-be dissidents or transgressors. The law in these trials represented 
a state ideology. The judge, the prosecution and the defense were acting on behalf of the 
government. These political trials were a sign of a subordination of the Czechoslovakian 
government to Soviet power. Among many trials, the most known are the trials of Rudolf 
Slánský and Milada Horáková, which demonstrate that the trials were conducted not only against 
“children of the revolution,” the topic of Slanský’s case, but also against active opponents of the 
Communist Party, such as the trial of Milada Horáková shows. See Kühn, supra note 85, at 26–
27. 
93.  MÁRIA M. KOVÁCS, LIBERAL PROFESSIONALS AND ILLIBERAL POLITICS, HUNGARY 
FROM THE HABSBURGS TO THE HOLOCAUST xix (1964). In comparison, Poland lost even more: 
From 7980 lawyers before WWII, fifty-seven percent did not survive the war, and from 5171 
judges before the war, 1110 did not survive. See RZEPLINSKI, A. DIE JUSTIZ IN DER 
VOLKSREPUBLIK POLEN 30 (1996). Zdeněk Kühn, Socialistická Justice [Socialist Judiciary], in 
KOMUNISTICKÉ PARVO V ČESKOSLOVENSKU [COMMUNIST LAW IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA] 824 
(Michal Bobek et al. eds., 2009). 
94.  Very often, these lay-judges did not finish high school. OTO ULČ, THE JUDGE IN 
A COMMUNIST STATE: A VIEW FROM WITHIN 9 (1972). 
95.  Act. No. 36/1957 Coll. ¶ 2 (election of the judges for the period of three years), 
followed by Act. No. 36/1964 Coll. ¶ 39 (for four years), and finally Act No. 156/1969 Coll. ¶ 
40 (prolonging the period to ten years). 
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the idea of the popular judiciary.96 Judges were elected by political 
bodies—National Council or local party committees,97 and nominated 
by the National Front.98 The argument was often presented that the lay-
judge might be even better in deciding legal issues, because the law 
should be clear to laymen as well. The lay-judges were also assigned 
to the surveillance of the professional judges.99 The notion of 
independence was completely different from the meaning of 
independence in democracy. The Constitution of the Czechoslovak 
Socialistic Republic from 1960 claimed to safeguard the independence 
of the judiciary, including courts and judges, to some extent, at least on 
paper. Yet it is clear from various testimonials that such independence 
existed to a very limited extent, and in politically-relevant cases was 
virtually non-existent. Even if “in about ninety percent of the court 
agenda there was not the slightest sign of interference in our decision-
making,” this “does not warrant the conclusion that ninety percent 
judicial independence and integrity existed.”100 Subordination to the 
party interests, cloaked as the interests of the people, and the interests 
of its powerful members existed because of “the awareness that 
someone might at any time inflict his ‘suggestion’ upon us, conditioned 
all our adjudication.”101 This form of independence was just an 
instrumental requirement obligating the judge to honor official state 
policy and the Party.102 
Moreover, the phenomenon of “telephone justice” was well 
known across the former Communist Bloc, albeit in its local 
mutations.103 “Telephone justice” refers to informal instructions on 
how to decide particular cases of interest to the ruling elites of the 
communist party and was based on informal (oral) commands, rather 
 
96.  Constitution art. 98, No. 100/1960 Coll. 
97.  Act on Election of Judges ¶ 2-5, 36/1957 Coll. 
98.  During the Communist Era in Czechoslovakia (1948–1989), National Front was the 
vehicle for control of all political and social activity by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. 
These elections were just confirmation of Party candidates. 
99.  KÁLMAN KULCSÁR, PEOPLE’S ASSESSORS IN THE COURTS: A STUDY ON SOCIOLOGY 
OF LAW 37 (1982). In the 1950s there were ten times more lay-judges in the judiciary than 
professional judges, and seventy percent of them were members of the Communist Party. Kühn, 
supra note 96, at 828. 
100.  ULČ, supra note 94 at 61. 
101.  Id. 
102.  MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: 
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 173 (1986). 
103.  Alena Ledeneva, Telephone Justice in Russia, 24 POST SOVIET AFF. 324, 350 (2008). 
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than formal documented commands, indicating the degree of 
discretion, web of mutual favors and non-transparency: A manifest 
function of such unwritten rules at every level is to preserve discretion 
and to achieve additional control and manageability on the basis of 
informal leverage in order to purse declared goals. The latent function, 
however, is to distinguish between insiders and outsiders and to benefit 
the insiders along the lines of “for friends we have everything, for 
enemies we have law.”104 
As Ledeneva points out, such behavior, seen through the lens of 
judicial independence, must nowadays be understood as a form of 
corruption.105 Telephone justice indicates that judges may have been 
victims of the encroaching executive power “in the name of the 
working people,” but it also posits that judges could be self-interested 
agents seeking self-empowerment through interaction and 
collaboration with the ruling elites or powerful actors. Thus, while the 
general presupposition of judicial independence is critical to upholding 
the rule of law, the concept needs to be operationalized within the 
context of certain social and cultural frameworks developed over 
decades.106 A well-designed, but mechanistic approach to judicial 
independence would not necessarily yield reliable and desirable results. 
In the 1960’s, “the mortification of the state,” as the Marxist 
theory called the outcome of the Marxist revolution, was happening: 
the number of the courts and judges was reduced and the judiciary was 
shrinking.107 The quality of the judiciary was very low, mainly because 
the intensive political influence, unqualified judges, and ideologically 
focused law schools. In 1968, during “Prague Spring,” things slowly 
started to improve, for instance, by rehabilitation of judges who had 
been dismissed from the bench because of their political opinions. 
Qualitative requirements for the judges improved, and lay-judges were 
 
104. Id. at 330. 
105. Id. 
106. One anecdote from the so-called normalization of the communist regime after 
liberalization of the year 1968 is telling: the communist party was undertaking cleansing of the 
local units of the party, whereas basically all of the units were expected to name some internal 
enemy within the party. Some of the, mainly Slovak, units of the party did not meet the 
expectation, claiming there was simply no internal enemy within their particular circles. Clearly, 
the internal cohesion of such units was very strong. 
107. Jiří Příbáň, Na stráži Jednoty Světa: Marxismus a Právní Teorie [On The Guard of 
Unity of the World: Marxism and Legal Theory], in KOMUNISTICKÉ PRAVO V 
ČESKOSLOVENSKU [COMMUNIST LAW IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA] 47 (Michal Bobek et al. eds., 
2009). 
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banned in higher courts. But this improvement did not last long. Since 
1969 and through 1970’s, the process called “normalization” started 
and continued. Most of the reforms of the Prague Spring were stopped 
and reform judges were banned from the bench again. The position of 
the judge completely lost the social dignity it had enjoyed fifty years 
before. Low salaries in the judiciary meant that courts did not 
experience a rush of the candidates for this position. Because of low 
interest for the job among men, women could apply for it. Thanks to 
this paradox, the judiciary in CEE countries is one of the professions 
that first reached gender equality.108 
Law became a flexible instrument of social engineering, instead 
of functioning as a normative system. For instance, the constitutions 
from 1948 and 1960 were not respected in practice, since although they 
guaranteed certain checks and balances, the power was concentrated in 
the hands of communist elites. Hence the rule of law had mutated into 
the rule of the party.109 
B. After 1989 
After the revolutions in 1989 many judges left the judiciary, either 
willfully because they sought private practice its financial rewards or 
because of the threat of “lustration process.” Lustration was supposed 
to prevent the former agents or collaborationists of the secret service of 
the communist state, leaders of Communist Party, and graduates of 
Soviet ideological universities from entering the government, 
administration, military, public media and public companies 
established by the government. It yielded very different outcomes in 
CEE countries. 
For example, in Czechoslovakia the National Assembly adopted 
the law on lustration110 for particular government positions. Hungary 
did the same. In both countries, there was a complaint that these laws 
are unconstitutional. While on the one hand, the Czechoslovak 
 
108.  See Rzeplinski, supra note 96, at 64 (42% women on the bench in Hungary (1980), 
50% in DDR (1980), and 55% in Poland (1986)); ULRIKE SHAW, WOMEN IN WORLD’S LEGAL 
PROFESSIONS 323 (Gisela Schulz & Ulrike Shaw eds., 2003); Kühn, supra note 96, at 846. 
109.  MICHAL BOBEK, KOMUNISTICKÉ PRAVO V ČESKOSLOVENSKU [COMMUNIST LAW IN 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA] (Pavel Molek & Vojtěch Šimíček eds., 2009). 
110.  Act No. 451/1991 Coll. 
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Constitutional Court decided111 that it complies with principles of rule 
of law to adopt such a law to build a just system, the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court112 decided in the opposite way. 
There were essentially two approaches, the application of 
lustration but without strict enforcement or a complete omission of 
lustration. The common criticism of the two approaches is that the post-
communist countries did not prevent the transformation of the 
previously elite groups from the old regime into the elites of the new 
regime: the same people who were in power before 1989 turned into 
the post-1989 elites with essentially the same power, thanks to 
connections, intelligence, and information they could use.113 
Judicial independence has had trouble developing in CEE. Under 
communist regimes, judicial independence and separation of powers 
were nonexistent and judges were considered loyal servants to the party 
in power.114 After the fall of communism in the late 1980s, states in 
CEE sought to form independent and democratic governments, using 
governments in the West as a guide. Poland, for example, based their 
 
111.  Decision of Constitutional Court of ČSFR Pl. ÚS 1/92 (Nov. 26, 1992) (“Unlike a 
totalitarian system based on immediate purpose and never linked to legal principles, the less the 
constitutional and democratic principles are based on completely different values and criteria. 
Each State, much less the one who was forced to suffer more than 40 years of fundamental rights 
violations by totalitarian power, has the right to establish a democratic establishment, to apply 
also legal measures aimed at averting the risk of subversion, the possible recurrence of 
totalitarianism, or at least their limitation. Legal certainty must be the certainty of its content 
values. The now-established rule of law, which is based on value discontinuity with the 
totalitarian regime, cannot therefore accept criteria based on a different system of values. 
Respecting continuity with the old system of values of the previous law would not, therefore, be 
a guarantee of legal certainty, but would, on the contrary, jeopardize the values of new ones, 
jeopardize legal certainty in society, and shake the confidence of the citizen in the credibility of 
the democratic system”). 
112.  Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] no. 11/1992 (contending that the 
change of the system is based on legality). The principle of legality requires the constitutional 
government to demand that the rules of the rule of law be fully applied. Political changes were 
made in a procedurally flawless manner, according to the rules of the old regime, including the 
legislative process, thereby preserving the binding force of these old legal norms. The old law 
retained its validity. Fundamental requirements of the constitutional state cannot be eliminated 
by reference to the historical situation and the requirement of justice in the rule of law. The rule 
of law cannot be based on the weakening of the rule of law. Legal certainty is more important 
than necessarily partial and subjective injustice. 
113.  ZOBEC, J. CERNIC, J.L, CENTRAL EUROPEAN JUDGES UNDER THE INFLUENCE: 
TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF THE EU REVISITED 135 (Michal Bobek ed., 2015). 
114.  Parau, supra note 63 at 14–15. 
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governmental structure off of the model found in the United States by 
establishing three separate and equal branches of government.115 
Some post-Communist states sought to develop an independent 
judiciary based on its forms in Western Europe. Others have been 
forced to develop independent judiciaries by external forces. For 
example, international organizations that award grants and loans to 
states require the state to establish a government with an independent 
judiciary and adopt the rule of law.116 Similarly, countries seeking 
accession into the European Union were pushed toward the 
establishment of a strong judiciary as a condition of acceptance.117 
The establishment of judicial independence in CEE has been 
challenging.118 Post-communist states must develop a strong, 
independent judiciary where a few short decades ago the concept was 
nonexistent. Many judges still lack the confidence to think for 
themselves while society still sees judges as corrupt and inefficient 
servants of state interests or their own interests. Further, many 
governmental structures these states have adopted from the West fail 
to take into account the region’s unique historical and cultural 
problems. 
One of the major problems countries in this region face is a 
judiciary comprised of magistrates who remain loyal to communist 
notions of the “proper” role of the judiciary.119 The judicial culture in 
Eastern Europe embodies the perception that judges are simply “well-
paid civil servants.”120 Judges see themselves as a “subservient 
technocrats” who lack the confidence to make judicial decisions on 
their own.121 Although judiciaries in these regions have achieved some 
sort of structural independence they still lack mentally independent 
judges.122 Even more problematic is the development of bureaucratic 
structures that encourage this subservient mindset. For example, in the 
Czech Republic, judicial appointment begins with the psychological 
testing of candidates in order to weed out those who may deviate from 
 
115. Markus B. Zimmer, Judicial Independence in Central and East Europe: The 
Institutional Context, 14 TULSA J. COMP. & INTL. L. 53, 58 (2006). 
116. Parau, supra note 63, at 15. 
117. Id. 
118.  Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence, supra note 35. 
119. Id. at 2. 
120. Id. at 8. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 10. 
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the norm.123 This type of system forces judges to become subservient 
to the legislature and does not allow them to think critically on their 
own.124 It fosters the same type of judicial culture that was found in 
communist Europe. But now, there is no communist party to direct the 
conduct of judges. And the powerful structures of independence mean 
the state lacks significant control. Instead, judges are largely under the 
control of superior judges. 
Not only do judges see themselves as humble civil servants, the 
perception of a subservient judiciary persists among many politicians 
and citizens in post-communist Europe.125 This perception has 
contributed to public distrust of judges which in turn has inhibited 
states’ efforts to reduce corruption. 126 During the accession period, 
several states seeking accession into the European Union (e.g.,  
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and 
Slovakia) showed evidence of widespread corruption. The lack of 
political and public trust led to a lack of support for reforms that could 
strengthen judicial independence. In fact, recent laws have been 
implemented to increase judicial accountability while decreasing 
independence. In Bulgaria, for example, a law has been proposed which 
would abolish a judges’ right to appeal disciplinary rulings.127 In the 
Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Hungary, stricter screening measures 
for judges were implemented partially because of the public distrust of 
judges.128 
Another problem states in the CEE face is establishing a 
governmental structure sympathetic to the region’s unique political 
history. Many of the states in this region have adopted models of 
governmental structure found in continental Western Europe.129 
However, looking uncritically toward the West for a proper 
government model may be problematic. Local culture must be 
considered in system design. States in the West have had a long time 
to develop the proper balance between judicial independence and 
 
123. Id. at 8. 
124. Id. at 8. 
125. EU ACCESSION MONITORING PROGRAM, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, MONITORING 
THE EU ACCESSION PROCESS: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 22 (Cent. Eur. Univ. Press 2001). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Zimmer, supra note 115, at 61. 
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judicial accountability.130 In contrast, states in the CEE are still trying 
to find the right way to transfer judicial oversight from the executive to 
the judiciary.131 These states have also had major problems with 
establishing a sustainable amount of judicial independence. 
In some CEE states, the executive still retains significant control 
over the judiciary. Modeled after the continental European structure, 
these states have created ministries of justice or councils comprised of 
members of the judicial, legislative, and executive branches with 
significant managerial control over the judiciary.132 The executive 
retains significant power over the judiciary through appointments, 
influence on oversight committees and budget control.133 Although 
retention of power over the judiciary by the executive is not uncommon 
in Europe, this relationship may be troublesome in historically 
communist countries, where the judiciary was once completely 
subservient to the executive. 
In other states the judiciary has been given too much 
independence. CEE states have tried to strengthen judicial 
independence by the creation of independent judicial councils like 
those found in Western Europe. The purpose of judicial councils is to 
prevent interference with judicial function from the power of the other 
branches.134 But what has emerged in some CEE states is a judiciary so 
completely independent that accountability is almost non-existent. 
IV. WHAT DID EUROPEAN UNION AND COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
DEMAND OF NEW ENTRANTS? 
A. The European Union Accession Criteria 
Judiciary and its improvement were not much discussed before 
1990. Occasionally some documents like UN Basic Principles135 
adopted by the UN General Assembly and the Bangalore Principles of 
 
130. Id. at 62. 
131. Id. at 61. 
132. Id.  
133. EU ACCESSION MONITORING PROGRAM, supra note 125. 
134. Bobek, supra note 35, at 4. 
135. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, endorsed by G.A. Res. 40/32 
(Nov. 29, 1985) and G.A. Res. 40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985). 
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Judicial Conduct136 emerged as international articulations of very 
general principles of judicial structure and conduct. But overall, the 
qualities of the judiciary was not a topic of serious discussion. 
In Europe, unlike in the United Nations, the process of principles 
of court administration went much further and deeper. As Michal 
Bobek and David Kosař mention, the process divides into two periods: 
from 1950’s until early 1990’s, neither the European Union nor 
Council of Europe paid significant attention to the models of court 
administration.137 However, in 1993, with the adoption of the EU 
Copenhagen criteria, developed and agreed upon during the European 
Council meeting in Copenhagen, the topic of court administration and 
organization became a significant focus in the ensuing EU accession 
process and the setting of condition vis-a-vis the candidate countries.138 
Ever since, judicial independence is seen as a critical element of 
the rule of law and as one of the core values of the European Union.139 
Judicial independence is required to effectively limit the exercise of 
state power over the judiciary. By protecting judicial decision-making 
from interference by state actors, judicial independence protects the 
rights and freedoms of individuals. The single market could not 
function without comparable and reliable judicial protection in the 
respective member states. Moreover, the effectiveness of common 
rules at the EU level should not be burdened by the fact that certain 
governments do not embrace the foundational elements of the Union. 
Member states should be free to negotiate and deal with states with 
comparable freedom and respect towards democracy and the rule of 
law when agreeing on detailed binding laws on majoritarian terms. The 
EU is a political entity, whose members implicitly share common 
 
136. Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the Judicial Group on 
Strengthening Judicial Integrity (2002). 
137. Cristina E. Parau, The Drive for Judicial Supremacy, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN 
TRANSITION 619 (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012). Bobek & Kosař, supra note 36, at 168. 
138. Parau, supra note 137; Bobek & Kosař, supra note 36, at 168. 
139. These are listed in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, i.e. the so-called 
“Homogeneity Clause,” which stipulates the core shared values of the member states and states 
vowing for the EU candidacy: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society 
in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail.” 
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values. Thus, it was clear that an independent judiciary was one of the 
critical aspects of the association criteria.140 
The European Union explicitly states that integration is founded 
on shared values, including the rule of law.141 European states may 
apply to become a member of the Union, once they fulfill the criterion 
of respecting the core EU values.142 Although Article 2 of the Treaty 
on European Union mentions the core principles, the interpretation and 
application of the provision on accession to the Union have been 
instable and subject to the actual enlargement policies.143 Further 
specifications of the criteria are included within the Copenhagen 
political criteria.144 
Membership requires that the candidate country achieve stability 
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities. Membership also requires 
the existence of a functioning market economy, and the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 
Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the 
obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union.145 
In a series of analytical papers, country reports and other country-
relevant documents, the criteria were further described and broken 
down into parameters, although the wide scope of these documents and 
papers left them necessarily vague and open to conflicting 
interpretations. This vague and open wording led to high degree of 
discretion by the Commission, who is their main interpreter, which in 
turn led to confusion and double standards applied during the accession 
 
140. VLADIMÍR BILČÍK, EÚ-MONITORING: PRÍSTUPOVÝ PROCES SLOVENSKA 
A IMPLIKÁCIE PRE POLITICKÉ INŠTITÚCIE, PRÁVNY ŠTÁTU A REGIONÁLNU POLITIKU 
[ACCESSION OF SLOVAKIA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, RULE OF LAW 
AND REGIONAL POLITICS] (2004). 
141. Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council on 15 and 16 October 
1999, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Oct. 15-16, 199), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits
/tam_en.htm [https://perma.cc/5TFG-XEYE]. 
142. Treaty on European Union art. 49. 
143. SUSANNA FORTUNATO, THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION: A COMMENTARY 1358 
(Hermann-Josef Blanke & Stelio Mangiameli eds., 2013). 
144. Additional criteria of administrative capacity were added in 1995 by the Madrid 
European Council. 
145. Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council on June 21 and 22, 
1993, EUR. PARLIAMENT (June 21-22, 1993), 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21225/72921.pdf [https://perma.cc/SNX9-6VH3]. 
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procedures and progress evaluations.146 Structural analysis of the 
Copenhagen criteria and related documents help identify critical 
components of the core elements of democracy and the rule of law, as 
they were assessed by the Commission and the Council during the 
accession procedures in late 1990s and early 2000s: (i) elections, (ii) 
the functioning of the legislature, (iii) the functioning of the judiciary, 
(iv) the functioning of the executive, and (v) anti-corruption measures 
(good governance).147 
Most of the criteria remained a challenge for all of the candidate 
countries from the CEE region, although their performance in 
individual criteria varied greatly. In the criterion of functioning 
judiciary, a host of features and elements were supposed to be complied 
with. 
[T]he judiciary should be independent, well-staffed and well-
trained, well-paid, efficient, respected and accessible to people. 
The self-governance of it should be real, including the non-
interference of the other branches of power in the training of 
judges in a special Judicial Institute, the work of their self-
governing bodies and their appointment, as well as the work of 
courts. The Lithuanian Constitutional Court ruling which found 
that some powers of the Ministry of Justice of the republic in the 
administering of justice contradicted the Constitution (Jarašiunas 
et al. 2003, 588) was welcomed by the Commission and mentioned 
in the 2000 Regular Report. The budget of the judiciary should 
also be largely in the hands of the judges. The Reports also 
demonstrate that lowering of the judges’ salaries is a breach of 
judicial independence: 2002 Lithuanian Report regards the 
Lithuanian Constitutional Court’s decision on prohibition of 
lowering of salaries of judges as a positive development (2002 
Lithuanian Report, 23).148 
Interestingly, the Commission’s reports on individual countries’ 
performance in achieving judicial independence in the pre-accession 
period are inconsistent. While the Commission favorably assessed 
mandatory re-trainings of Estonian judges, it remained neutral on the 
 
146. Eline De Ridder & Dimitry Kochenov, Democratic Conditionality in Eastern 
Enlargement: Ambitious Window Dressing, 16 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 589 (2011). 
147.  Dimitry Kochenov, Behind the Copenhagen Façade. The Meaning and Structure of 
the Copenhagen Political Criterion of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 8 EUR. INTEGRATION 
ONLINE PAPERS 1 (2004). 
148.  Id. at 20. 
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apparent conflict between the principle of independence and “an urgent 
necessity to improve the training of the judiciary” in case of Czech 
Republic, where the constitutional court found compulsory trainings 
incompatible with independence.149 The reports also did not give clear 
guidance on what the evaluation on “the uniform methods and criteria, 
not interfering with the independence of the judiciary” meant. The 
inconsistency is also manifested in the fact that strong, structural 
judicial independence from the executive was not necessarily a 
prerequisite of the EU membership.150 Czech Republic has never 
adopted an independent council representing the formally independent 
judiciary, yet its score in substantial judicial independence is superior 
to those of the rest of the CEE countries entering the EU in 2000s, with 
notable exception of Estonia.151 
The Copenhagen criteria and their operationalization in the 
Commission’s reports lacked consistency and comparability across the 
candidate countries, as “the demands [the Commission was] sending to 
the candidate countries were often contradictory and almost entirely 
unpredictable.”152 “[It is] clear that the candidate countries’ readiness 
to meet the initial political criteria was a political question on the EU 
side, rather than a result of any more or less serious assessment.”153 
The European framework for achieving common standards and 
approaches to the judiciary includes the EU’s consultative body on the 
judiciary called The European Network of Councils for the Judiciary 
(“ENCJ”), which periodically submits reports on condition of 
judiciaries in member states of the EU and proposes lock-step 
improvements of institutional structure.154 ENCJ works with financial 
 
149. Id. at 21. 
150.  Spáč, supra note 10, at 14–15. 
151. Id. 
152. De Ridder & Kochenov, supra note 146, at 9. 
153. Id. 
154. See generally EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY (ENCJ), 
COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY REPORT 2010-2011 (2011), available at 
https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/pdf/workinggroups/report_project_team_councils_for_the
_judiciary_2010_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLW6-8SDT]; EUROPEAN NETWORK OF 
COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY (ENCJ), INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE 
JUDICIARY 2013-2014 (2014), available at https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/
pdf/workinggroups/independence/encj_report_independence_accountability_adopted_version_
sept_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZW8-XDBY]; EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE 
JUDICIARY (ENCJ), DISTILLATION OF ENCJ PRINCIPLES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
GUIDELINES 2004-2017 (2017), available at https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/pdf/
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support of the European Commission. It consists of national institutions 
in the member states of the European Union which are independent of 
the executive and legislature and which are responsible for the support 
of the judiciaries in the independent delivery of justice. 
Moreover, the Council of Europe, although politically far less 
significant than the EU and its structures and institutions, has its own 
consultative institution called Consultative Council of European 
Judges, which is devoted to contributing to implementation of the 
Framework Global Action Plan for Judges in Europe. It has an advisory 
function on general questions relating to independence, impartiality 
and competence of judges.155 
Another consultative body related to the CoE is the European 
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice. The Commission develops 
concrete measures and tools aimed at policy makers and judicial 
practitioners in order to analyze the functioning of judicial systems and 
orientate public policies of justice.156 Their goals are to have a better 
knowledge of judicial timeframes and optimize judicial time 
management, to promote the quality of the public service of justice, and 
to facilitate the implementation of European standards and support 
member states in their reform of court organization. 157 
The CoE and EU have required the creation of a clear separation 
of powers, with guardian being the institution at the top of the judiciary. 
 
workinggroups/encj_distillation_report_2004_2017.pdf; [https://perma.cc/W24F-CYZT]; 
EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY (ENCJ), INDEPENDENCE, 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND QUALITY OF THE JUDICIARY (2017), available at 
https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/pdf/workinggroups/independence/encj_report_ia_ga_
adopted_ga_13_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/UVL3-495R]. 
155.  For documents of the Consultative Council of European Judges (“CCJE”), see 
Framework Global Action Plan for Judges in Europe, CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUR. 
JUDGES (Feb. 12, 2001), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/
DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680657eee [https://perma.cc/57EL-HX8A]; 
European Charter on the statute for judges, COUNCIL OF EUR. (July 8-10, 1998), 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=
090000168068510f [https://perma.cc/TWD9-GQ85]. 
156.  See generally Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers to 
member states on judges: independence, efficiency and responsibilities, Council of Europe 
Portal (Nov. 17, 2010), https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=
09000016805afb78 [https://perma.cc/LUW2-JW2N]; COUNCIL OF EUROPE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE (CEPEJ), 
https://www.coe.int/T/dghl/cooperation/cepej/default_en.asp [https://perma.cc/KW54-8LWW] 
[hereinafter CEPEJ]. 
157. See generally Framework Global Action Plan, supra note 155; CEPEJ, supra note 
156. 
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The independence of judges, in a globalized and interdependent 
society, should be regarded by every citizen as a guarantee of truth, 
freedom, respect for human rights, and impartial justice free from 
external influence. The independence of judges is not a prerogative 
or privilege granted in their own interest, but in the interest of the 
rule of law and of anyone seeking and expecting justice. 
Independence as a condition of judges’ impartiality therefore 
offers a guarantee of citizens’ equality before the courts.158 
 
In the 1990s, different states endorsed different structures 
safeguarding the independence of the judiciary, and the CoE did not 
force states to change those systems that worked. “However, over the 
years CoE lost the flexibility and became a strong advocate of Judicial 
Council model.”159 The eventual creation “of the Council of Judiciary 
Euro-model presents a puzzle.”160 “Neither the EU nor the CoE have 
ever laid down any normative underpinnings of this model.”161 Both of 
the organizations simply internalized the recommendations of various 
judicial consultative bodies, without addressing or assessing their 
content. 
Bobek and Kosař provide a list of five key requirements of the 
judicial council Euro-model, which they gathered from numerous 
organs and affiliated bodies of the EU and the CoE; there appears to be 
some consensus on these requirements in Europe: 
1) A judicial council should have constitutional status.162 
2) At least 50 per cent of the members of the judicial council 
must be judges and these judicial members must be selected by 
their peers, that is by other judges.163 
3) A judicial council ought to be vested with decision-making 
and not merely advisory powers.164 
 
158. Opinion no. 10, Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), ¶ 9 (2007). 
159. Bobek & Kosař, supra note 36, at 161. 
160.  Id. at 169. 
161.  Id. at 161. 
162.  ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, supra note 154, at ¶ 1.4; CCJE, 
Opinion no. 10 ¶ 11 (2007). 
163.  ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, supra note 154, at ¶ 2.1; CCJE, 
Opinion. No. 10 ¶ 18 (2007). 
164.  ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, supra note 154, at ¶ 3.4; CCJE, 
Opinion no.10 ¶¶ 48, 49, 60 (2007). 
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4) A judicial council should have substantial competences in all 
matters concerning the career of a judge including selection, 
appointment, promotion, transfer, dismissal and disciplining.165 
5) A judicial council must be chaired either by the President or 
Chief Justice of the highest court or the neutral head of state.166 
B.  Council for the Judiciary 
The functions, proper powers, accountability of, and relationships 
with judges’ interests of the institution called “judicial council” create 
enormous controversies in emerging democracies. The concept of a 
judicial council as a body to represent the judiciary in the panoply of 
state powers and entities is simple enough. But how should it be formed 
and with what membership? Should it have exclusive power to select 
new judges? Should it control and allocate the judiciary’s budget? 
What, if any, role should it have in disciplining judges? Should its 
functions be transparent or opaque? Questions like these, and more, 
have bedeviled emerging democracies, particularly in post-communist 
settings. 
Judicial councils are generally composed of the representatives 
selected by judges themselves, typically sitting together with a minority 
of the representatives from other branches of government. The council 
takes over some or all powers relating to the administration of justice, 
commonly including the selection and promotion of judges, 
disciplinary powers and others that might otherwise be exercised by a 
ministry of justice.167 The underlying idea of the existence of a judicial 
 
165.  ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, supra note 154, at ¶ 3.1; CCJE, 
Opinion no.10. ¶ 42. (2007). 
166.  ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010-2011, supra note 154, at ¶4.1; CCJE 
Opinion no.10. ¶ 33 (2007). The “neutral head of state” option exists as a Council Chair 
alternative to the more common judge selected by the judiciary itself. CCJE and ENCJ insist on 
an impartial person presiding the Council, while having any close relations to political parties. 
In parliamentary systems, what is characteristic for Visegrad countries, there is no objection 
from CCJE and ENCJ to appoint the Head of the State to the position of the Council. The 
President is obliged to give up his affiliation to a political party in the moment he is appointed 
to the function. This requirement seems to secure the impartiality of the President, but in fact 
does not mean to change the preferences or interests of the President. It is usually perceived as 
a formal requirement without any possibility to be controlled or sanctioned. 
167.  CCJE, Opinion no. 10 ¶ 42 (2007) (recommending that the Council for the Judiciary 
ensures that the following tasks, to be performed preferably by the Council itself, or in 
cooperation with other bodies, are fulfilled in an independent manner: 
• the selection and appointment of judges 
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council is to allow judges to make decisions in cases relatively free 
from undue outside or administrative influence and to have one central 
body that represents the judiciary in relation with the other branches of 
the government. A body of this type was established in Poland 
(1989),168 in Hungary (1997),169 and in Slovakia (2002).170 The Czech 
Republic is a recent entrant to the EU that did not create a national 
council for the judiciary. There were debates about creating such an 
institution since 1998. But there is still no Czech statute 
or constitutional provision that would create a national council for the 
judiciary at present. 
C. Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic 
The situation in Slovakia receives our greatest attention. Slovakia 
had diligently adopted the model of strong judicial independence, 
which backfired and did not yield improvements in performance and 
independence indicators. In order to assess the reforms of the judiciary 
in Slovakia, it is important to understand the forces influencing its 
trajectory since the 1989 revolution. After the fall of the communist 
regime in 1989 and the division of Czechoslovakia into two states in 
1992-93, Slovakia struggled to maintain a democratic regime between 
1994-1998. The regime suffered from various defects in its governance 
structures and shortcomings in development of the country on many 
levels and aspects, including the independent judiciary.171 Eventually, 
 
• the promotion of judges 
• the evaluation of judges 
• disciplinary and ethical matters 
• the training of judges 
• the control and management of a separate budget 
• the administration and management of courts 
• the protection of the image of judges 
• the provision of opinions to other powers of the State 
• the co-operation with other relevant bodies on national, European and 
international level 
• the responsibility towards the public: transparency, accountability, 
reporting).  
168.  THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND art. 186. 
169.  CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY art. 25., sub, 4. 
170.  CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC art. 141a; On the Judicial Council of the 
Slovak Republic, Act No. 185/2002 Coll.  
171.  Regular Report from the Commission on Slovakia’s Progress Towards Accession, 
COMMISSION OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES, (Dec. 17, 1998), http://aei.pitt.edu/44608/1/
slovakia_1998.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW2B-DHEH]. 
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an election victory of the pro-reform and pro-European coalition 
started to build the institutions; and, through a series of reforms, fast-
tracked the country on its way towards the EU accession. Among the 
reforms, structural independence of the judiciary was introduced upon 
the recommendation of numerous recognized documents and 
international organizations; yet the country would continue to search 
for the balance of independence and accountability for many more 
years. The right balance has not yet been found and the country has 
suffered as a result. 
Before these reforms, procedures for nomination and removal of 
judges was under strong, even excessive, powers of the Ministry of 
Justice. Judges had to undergo an initial four-year probation period, 
during which they were screened out for “fitness” for the judgeship. 
Such screenings constituted infringement of the independence 
principle, which has been embedded in the constitution since its 
adoption in 1992.172 The judiciary suffered from a lack of capacities of 
judges and poor court administration, which led to massive pileups of 
caseloads, a problem that has still not been solved. Judges from the 
previous regime continued to serve as there has not been a lustration of 
judges for their too-close relationships with the communist party and 
the former regime. As the political elites of the (semi-)autocratic 
regime of 1994-98 were closely connected with former communist 
elites, no significant changes to the personnel of the court structures 
could have been expected.173 New judges were thus educated and 
socialized in an environment that had not changed significantly from 
the previous regime, an environment that was clearly inconsistent with 
substantial independence of courts, judiciary, and judges. This lack of 
substantial changes to the courts’ personnel turned out to be an 
important factor toward the perils of the independent judiciary, just as 
well as it was for other public organizations in the post-communist 
countries.174 
 
172.  Károly Bárd, Judicial Independence in the Accession Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Baltics, in JUDICIAL INTEGRITY 296 (2004). 
173.  Although Slovakia signed the first association agreement with the European 
Communities in 1991 as a part of Czecho-Slovak Federation and later in 1993 as Slovakia, it did 
not receive the invitation to the Communities (Union) along with the rest of the Visegrad 
countries due to its democratic deficit in 1994-1998 period. The formal invitation came after the 
election victory of the pro-reform coalition in 1998. 
174.  Bobek, The Fortress of Judicial Independence, supra note 35. 
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The reforms adopted by Slovakia in early 2001 were accepted 
positively by the European Commission; the reforms were called 
“considerable progress.” In 2002, the Commission advised the country 
to ensure their proper implementation, in particular placing much hope 
on the newly established Judicial Council.175 Although, the reforms 
were politically well-accepted abroad, the domestic political scene was 
not wholly unified.176 Yet, taking into consideration the fact that many 
of the critiques of the reform proposals were themselves involved in 
attacks on the judiciary during 1994-98 period, this lack of wide 
consensus did not necessarily mean very much. Contrary to previous 
experiences, the ministry of justice involved the representatives of the 
judiciary in cooperation on the reform proposals, especially those 
concerning the features of the judicial independence. 
In time, the country’s judiciary progressively worsened, 
especially during 2006-10, when the formal independence of the 
judiciary became even stronger. This resulted from political support of 
a parliamentary coalition composed of people who were the prime 
actors in the 1994-98 undemocratic era and of people with ties to the 
former regime, including the former chief justice of the supreme court, 
Štefan Harabin. Independent from elected state actors, the judiciary 
developed into a self-interested branch, which became and continues 
to be the least trusted public institution in Slovakia.177 
As Kosař described the situation, 
The European Commission, supported by the CoE and various 
advisory bodies, had the necessary leverage at its disposal and 
started to exercise significant pressure on the post-communist 
states that sought accession to the EU to adopt particular judicial 
reforms. These “pan-European” bodies identified the judicial 
 
175.  Regular Report on Slovakia’s Progress Towards Accession, COMMISSION OF THE 
EUR. COMMUNITIES, at 24 (Oct. 9, 2002), https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/slovakia_EC%20Regular
%20Report%20on%20Slovakia%202002_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3ZC-52MU]. 
176.  Even though the consensus on the reform was not all-encompassing, the 
constitutional majority had to be achieved to adopt the reform. 
177.  60.4% of respondents did not trust the judiciary in 2016, although the situation 
improved in the past few years. This could perhaps be attributed to the corrective measures 
introduced recently. See VIA IURIS, REPORT OF THE SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC OPINION ON THE 
JUDICIARY (2016). 
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council model as the most appropriate means of reforming the 
judiciary.178 
However, that does not mean that the model of the council was 
well thought through. The Council of Europe and the European Union 
merely relied on the work done by the judicial consultative bodies. 
Their effort was not significantly discussed or reviewed.179 
The pressure on the aspirant states from the international sphere 
is also reflected in the explanatory memoranda to the Slovak 
Constitutional Act No. 90/2001 Coll. (“the Act”), which introduced the 
Judicial Council. The explanatory report explicitly referenced a 
recommendation adopted by the Council of Europe: Recommendation 
No. R. (94) from October 12-13, 1994.180 The explanatory memoranda 
pointed also to General Assembly Resolutions 40/32 of November 29, 
1985 and 40/146 of December 13, 1985, and the explanatory 
memoranda also pointed to the Recommendation of the Council of 
Europe No. R. (94) 12 on European Charter on the Statute of Judges of 
July 10, 1998. The idea was to strengthen the independence and 
autonomy of the judiciary from executive and legislative branches, 
which, according to the Report by the expert mission of the European 
Commission from November 1997, had too much power while the self-
government of judges was practically non-existent.181 
The pressure from the European Union and from the CoE is 
evidenced by the Slovak scholarly discourse on various levels. For 
example, Drgonec explicitly states that the Judicial Council was 
established by the will of the European Union.182 On the other hand, 
Čič and the authors of newer textbooks of the constitutional law do not 
 
178. DAVID KOSAŘ, PERILS OF JUDICIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN TRANSITIONAL 
SOCIETIES: HOLDING THE LEAST ACCOUNTABLE BRANCH TO ACCOUNT 123 (2016). 
179. Michal Bobek & David Kosař, Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study 
in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe, 15 GER. L.J. NO. 7 1257, 1261 (2014) 
(claiming that the Euro-model of the Judicial council is an unsuitable solution to problems of 
independency, accountability and performance of courts). 
180. Constitutional Act No. 90/2001 Coll., NÁRODNÀ RADA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY 
[NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC] (2001), 
http://www.nrsr.sk/dl/Browser/Document?documentId=162485 [https://perma.cc/5N64-5JKT] 
(explaining Constitutional Act No. 90/2001 Coll.). 
181. Id. 
182. JÁN DRGONEC, ÚSTAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC] 1205 (2015). 
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stress this fact.183 From the latter point of view, it might seem that the 
Judicial Council is a natural part of the Slovak constitutional system, 
but this is not the case. Drgonec and even Orosz, who was one of the 
drafters of the constitutional amendment establishing the Judicial 
Council, reminds us of the drawbacks originating in the outside 
pressure. Drgonec states that the Judicial Council was implemented 
into the Constitution relatively quickly and the consequences are still 
visible. The reason for the existence of the Judicial Council was not 
explained and it stays unclear up-to-date.184 He asserts that even the 
explanatory memoranda is unclear, vague and contradictory, while it 
also misinterprets the text.185 
Ladislav Orosz, one of the authors of the constitutional 
amendment and a Justice of the Constitutional Court since 2009, 
commented on the process and result of their effort self-critically. He 
admitted that, based on the hectic atmosphere, some failings had 
occurred. As to the Judicial Council, he stated that “[w]ith the passing 
time and the dangerously evolving power struggle for the rule over 
judiciary it shows that the writers of the constitutional amendment had 
a too idealistic vision about . . . the end adopted means of composition 
and operation of the Judicial Council.”186 
Because the Judicial Council lacked a constitutional definition, 
the Constitutional Court tried to provide one. The understanding of the 
institution evolved from the “constitutional public authority body 
which guarantees independent position of the judiciary in relation to 
 
183.  MILAN ČIČ ET AL., KOMENTÁR K ÚSTAVE SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [THE 
COMMENTARY TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC] (2012); see, e.g., DANIEL 
KROŠLÁK ET AL., ÚSTAVNÉ PRÁVO [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 616 (2016) (claiming that the 
raison d’être of the Judicial Council was the effort to diversify the judicial legitimacy). 
184.  DRGONEC, supra note 182. 
185.  DRGONEC, supra note 182. 
186.  LADISLAV OROSZ ET AL., ÚSTAVNÝ SYSTÉM SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY (DOTERAJŠÍ 
VÝVOJ, AKTUÁLNY STAV, PERSPEKTÍVY) [CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC (EVOLUTION, PRESENT STATE, PERSPECTIVES)] 59 (2009). One of the issues Orosz 
had in mind was perhaps the merged seat of the President of the Supreme Court and President 
of the Judicial Council.  In fact, the formal powers of those two positions are theoretically more 
or less organizational, but when occupied by one person he or she becomes the face of the 
judiciary and seems to have strong legitimacy. This was the case of Štefan Harabin. Hence, the 
constitution was changed, and positions were separated in 2014. Moreover, there is discussion 
about nature of the Judicial Council and its position in the constitutional system. We will return 
to this issue in context of the parameter of independence of the Judicial Council. 
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other state authorities”187 through the “self-government body sui 
generis” which performs even the functions of public administration 
body188 and the body whose “fundamental institutional component is 
independence”189 to be finally understood as the “special independent 
constitutional body of judicial power that guarantees mainly 
independence of judiciary and judicial legitimacy, while it is 
responsible for the operation of judiciary, administration of the judicial 
power and judiciary and also for transparency of the judiciary; hence it 
shall be the fully-fledged partner of the legislative and executive 
power.”190 
However, the Constitutional Court later on reflected on the reality 
that the Euro-model is only one of many possible models and that it 
cannot be claimed that one model is suitable for each state because its 
mechanical transposition cannot guarantee the wanted level of 
independence, efficiency, and professionalism.191 The Euro-model was 
just that: a model. It was not designed with reference to local conditions 
in each of the entering states. The Constitutional Court even warned 
against the prospect of corporativism within the judiciary if the Judicial 
Council would be governed by judges.192 However, it still awarded the 
Judicial Council with the characteristics of independence. This became 
a matter of debate. Judge Mészáros in his dissenting opinion warned 
that the Constitutional Court was itself writing the Constitution because 
the Judicial Council was not defined as independent in the Constitution. 
If the Constitutional Court does so, he continues, there is a need to 
explain what independence of that body means in practice: what is the 
Judicial Council is independent of and to what it is independent.193 
In most countries, when introducing the concept of judicial 
independence to law students or lay persons, it is not common to offer 
disclaimers in the same breath. However, in Slovakia, warnings about 
 
187.  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic no. III. ÚS 79/04 (Oct. 
29, 2004) (Slovk.). 
188.  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic no. I. ÚS 62/06 (Mar. 1, 
2006) (Slovk.). 
189.  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic no. IV. ÚS 46/2011 (Feb. 
17, 2011) (Slovk.). 
190.  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic no. PL. ÚS 2/2012 (Nov. 
18, 2015) (Slovk.). 
191.  Id. 
192.  Id. 
193.  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic PL. ÚS 2/2012 (Nov. 1 
(Mészáros, J. dissenting) (Slovk.). 
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misunderstandings of the concept of independence found its way even 
into textbooks. Svák and Cibulka, while quoting the decision of the 
Constitutional Court, stress that independence is not the privilege of 
judges but the inevitable condition of the accountability of the judiciary 
for making impartial and independent judicial decisions. Then they 
state that after the revolution in 1989 judges rightly asked for 
independence. However, their successful political pressure motivated 
mainly by personal guarantees of independence pushed back the 
purpose of independence.194 The means were mistaken for the end, and 
the actual purpose of judicial independence was lost within the self-
interest of the judges.195 
D. Selection and Appointment of Judges of the 
General Courts 
Changes in the Slovak law that were justified by the requirements 
of the European Union and other international bodies led to insulation 
of judiciary in the selection of new judges and to the partial backlash 
(e.g., Constitutional Court struck down part of the law) when 
Parliament tried to address the problem of this insulation in 2011. The 
EU criticism about the lack of independence of the Slovak judiciary in 
the process of accession also focused on the system of selection and 
appointment of judges.196 Again, the independence as a means to 
achieve impartial justice was mistaken for the end. In the 1990’s, judge 
selection was in the hands of the legislative and executive power.197 
The Parliament elected judges of the general courts based on proposals 
from the Minister of Justice.198 In 2001, the Judicial Council was given 
the competence to nominate judges for appointment (and removal) to 
the President of the Republic which was supposed to limit the influence 
on judges coming from state actors.199 The Judicial Council considered 
 
194.  JAN SVÁK & ĽUBOR CIBULKA, ÚSTAVNÉ PRÁVO SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY 
[CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC] 402 (2006). 
195.  Id.  
196.  ŁUKASZ BOJARSKI &WERNER S. KÖSTER, THE SLOVAK JUDICIARY: ITS CURRENT 
STATE AND CHALLENGES 74 (2011) 
197.  ÚSTAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC], No. 
460/1992 Coll.  arts. 86(i), 145, para. 1 (Slovk.). 
198.  Id. 
199.  ÚSTAVA SLOVENSKEJ REPUBLIKY [CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC], No. 
460/1992 Coll., after adoption of the Constitutional Act No. 90/2001 Coll. art. 141a, para. 4(a) 
(Slovk.). 
2018] EU POLICY TOWARD EUROPEAN ENTRANTS  531 
applicants who succeeded before the selection committee or who had 
status of judicial candidates.200 The composition of committees varied 
over time: between 2001 until 2011, the majority of committee 
membership was constituted by the judiciary (council of judges: self-
administrative unit on respective courts, presidents of the courts, 
collegium of presidents of the courts, etc.) and almost always solely of 
judges.201 Essentially, the judges selected new judges at the level of 
selection committee and more or less also at the level of Judicial 
Council. The judicial candidates who could become judges directly 
without participation in selection of judges were also selected in a 
procedure administered by judges.202 
There were many complaints of nepotism and corruption in 
selection process.203 Sometimes the names of successful applicants 
were known even before the selection procedure started.204 Too many 
applicants and judicial candidates seemed to be connected with 
judges.205 Hence a reform was proposed. 
Minister of Justice, Lucia Žitňanská, strived to “open” the 
judiciary by changing the system of appointment of judges. Based on 
law from 2011, the selection became much more transparent and judges 
also lost the majority on selection committees. The new committees 
were supposed to consist of two members from the basket created by 
 
200.  On Judges and Lay Judges Act No. 385/2000 Coll. § 28 (Slovk.). Judicial candidates 
or judicial trainees were lawyers who were trained specifically in order to become judges. 
201.  Id. 
202.  Act No. 40/1964 Coll. (Slovk.); Act No. 401/2006 Coll. (Slovk.); Act No. 430/2009 
Coll.; Act No. 132/2017 Coll (Slovk.). 
203.  The informal symbol of nepotism (of course without any formal charge) became 
Judge Imrich Volkai, the President of the Regional Court of Košice. The members of his family 
such as his wife, daughter, son-in-law or daughter-in-law all work on the court he serves on or 
within the region of Košice. One should note that his daughter-in-law became judge after the 
reforms, under a new more transparent selection, but again with majority of judicial power in 
selection committees. See, e.g., Samuel Spáč a Erik Skácal, Rozrastie sa Sudcovsky Klan 
Volkaiovcov o DALŠIU POSILU?, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL SLOVENSKO BLOG (Nov. 
27, 2015), http://transparency.sk/sk/rozrastie-sa-sudcovsky-klan-volkaiovcov-o-dalsiu-posilu/ 
[https://perma.cc/WF75-4SLF ]. 
204.  See, e.g., Interview with Jana Dubovcová, former judge who later became the Slovak 
ombudsperson, (Apr. 23, 2010), available at https://www.pluska.sk/plus7dni/rozhovor/04/
ovladnuta-justicia.html [https://perma.cc/WA3X-JZJS ].  
205.  See, e.g., Kto je s kym Rodina na našich súdoch, SME BLOG (Nov. 20, 2013), 
https://transparency.blog.sme.sk/c/342665/Kto-je-s-kym-rodina-na-nasich-sudoch.html 
[https://perma.cc/9JCC-9MKD]; Hlásite sa za sudcu? Mat’ rodinu v justí?, SME BLOG (May 
16, 2014), https://transparency.blog.sme.sk/c/356200/hlasite-sa-za-sudcu-mat-rodinu-v-
justicii-pomoze.html [https://perma.cc/X4S5-FRTX].  
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the Minister of Justice, one member from the basket created by the 
Parliament, one member from the basket established by the Judicial 
Council and one member elected by the local council of judges of the 
court with vacant seats.206 Those members did not need to be judges, 
nor even lawyers, but they had to be able to evaluate the candidates. 
The members of the committees were chosen from the baskets by the 
president of the court with vacant seats.207 However, the reform was 
challenged before the Constitutional Court by a group of forty-six 
members of the parliament claiming that it violated the principle of 
independence of the judiciary and international standards,208 
specifically claiming that judges did not have a majority in the selection 
committees as the Recommendation suggested.209 They also 
interpreted establishment of the Judicial Council as the proof that 
judges had to have a majority vote in the process of judicial 
appointment, otherwise the process violated the independence of the 
judiciary and it was unconstitutional.210 Unfortunately, the majority of 
the Constitutional Court in part agreed with the applicants. The 
Constitutional Court stated that even though three branches of power 
cooperated in the process of selection and appointment of judges, only 
the judge selected by the selection committee could get before the 
Judicial Council and hence the selection committee had a crucial say in 
the process.211 As the majority of the committee members were 
selected by the political branches, the Constitutional Court simply 
stated that there was a threat of politicization of the judiciary and hence 
the law violated the principle of the separation of powers.212 As a result, 
the Constitutional Court provided constitutional relevance, even force, 
to the recommendations of international organizations. Obviously, the 
international non-binding standards received strong legitimacy in the 
1990s, because of the semi-authoritative regime under Vladimir Mečiar 
 
206.  Act on Judges No. 385/2000 Coll. §§ 28, 29 (effective May 1, 2011) (Slovk.). 
207.  Id. 
208.  See Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Comm. of Ministers to Member States on 
the Independence, Efficiency, and Role of Judges, COMMISSION OF MINISTERS (Oct. 13, 1994), 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=
09000016804c84e2 [https://perma.cc/2Z2K-GZXL]. 
209. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic no. PL. ÚS 102/2011, 
Arguments of Claimants (Slovk.). 
210.  Id. 
211. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic no. PL. ÚS 102/2011, 
Part VI.E. (Slovk.). 
212.  Id. 
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during that time, since they were seen as a road to developed West. But 
it is problematic to “blindly” rely on recommendations addressed to 
countries with different legal systems, constitutional experience and 
civil society or even to over-interpret them in order to back up the 
problematic argument such as the claim that independence of judiciary 
means that judges must have decisive vote in selection of judges. 
The 2011 series of reforms proposal further aimed at increasing 
the accountability.213 Transparency of the branch was strengthened by 
publishing of all courts decisions, information and documents about 
selection and promotion procedures and the recordings of meetings of 
the Judicial Council.214 Moreover, the reports on judges’ performance 
got more frequent and thorough.215 Further reforms were introduced in 
recent years in order to balance the strong independence with 
appropriately strong accountability, such as improving the selection 
procedures and their supervision, increasing the efficiency of 
disciplinary procedures, and the evaluation of judges. The position of 
the Chairman of the Judicial Council became separated from the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court in 2014, with the goal of diluting the 
previous concentration of judicial management power in one 
individual.216 Moreover, the composition of the Judicial Council 
should progressively change, as the recent change of legislation 
indicates that the parliament, president and the government nominate 
non-judges for members of the Judicial Council.217 These recent 
corrective measures should be understood as an attempt to swing the 
pendulum of power division towards the accountability, although it 
 
213.  See Act No. 33/2011 Coll., Explanatory Memoranda (Sept. 22, 2010) (Slovk.), 
available at https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Dynamic/Download.aspx?DocID=346941 
[https://perma.cc/SGF8-WP27]; Act No. 467/2011 Coll., Explanatory Memoranda (Jan. 18, 
2012) (Slovk.), available at https://www.najpravo.sk/dovodove-spravy/rok-2011/467-2011-z-
z.html. 
214.  This was done by the series of laws – Act no. 495/2010 Coll., Act no. 33/2011 Coll. 
and Act no. 467/2011 Coll. - that, among others, amended the Act of judges, Act on Courts or 
Act on Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic. See Act No. 495/2010 Coll. (Slovk.); Act No. 
33/2011 Coll. (Slovk.); Act No. 467/2011 Coll (Slovk.) 
215.  See Act on Judges No. 385/2000 Coll. §§ 27 (effective Jan. 1, 2012) (Slovk.). 
216.  See Constitutional Act No. 161/2014 Coll., amending Art. 141a of the Constitution 
and the Explanatory Memoranda (Slovk.), available at https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Dynamic/
Download.aspx?DocID=397222 [https://perma.cc/6VZJ-BAWC]. 
217.  See Act No. 152/2017 Coll., amending On Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic 
Act No. 185/2002 Coll (Slovk.). The President, the government and the parliament each 
nominates three members of the Judicial Council out of a total of eighteen members. A direct 
vote by judges elects the other nine members.  
534 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:2 
remains to be seen whether and when the pendulum eventually finds its 
balance. 
V. PROBLEMS FOSTERED BY THE EU-ENCOURAGED MODEL: 
TOO MUCH INDEPENDENCE? 
Although the model presented in the documents of the Council of 
Europe 218 and the European Union219 perhaps might produce good 
results, it was not the case of CEE post-communist countries. There the 
model in practice produced an isolated, largely unaccountable judiciary 
staffed and especially led by judges bent on corrupt, self-favoring 
action. Firstly, there was no significant personnel change in the 
judiciary.220 A majority of judges were educated before 1989 and after 
1989 the school system did not accomplish any mentionable reform. It 
was unwise to bestow extensive self-regulatory powers on a post-
communist judiciary immediately after the fall of the regime.221 
Furthermore, the model enabled the majoritarian group of judges 
to select their own candidates and exclude those with opposing 
opinions on the reforms of the judiciary.222 In fact, if the majority 
prefers the status quo, the Council of Europe would be highly unlikely 
to initiate any reform of the judiciary.223 The model is not fit to counter 
the accumulation of power in hands of a few.224 Judges might have a 
tendency to elect a person who furthers their interests: guarantees them 
higher salaries, less accountability, and more independence, behind 
which corruption more easily exists without detection. This shows that 
the key change is not the formal institutional reform that established 
independence but the switch of an attitude of the judges, a courage to 
be independent and accountable. As Zalar claims: “[The] introduction 
of judicial self-government in a situation of transition does not entail 
 
218.  See CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN JUDGES, Opinion No. 10, (Nov. 23, 
2007), https://rm.coe.int/168074779b [https://perma.cc/Y5HJ-M46G]. 
219.  See EUROPEAN NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY, COUNCILS FOR THE 
JUDICARY REPORT 2010-2011 (2011).  
220.  See Bobek, supra note 35, at 105-06 
221.  Id. 
222.  See, e.g., CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN JUDGES, Opinion No. 10, (Nov. 
23, 2007), https://rm.coe.int/168074779b [https://perma.cc/TF5T-5MH7]. 
223.  Id.  
224.  Id. 
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anything other than the preservation of the judiciary as it was 
established by the undemocratic communist authorities.”225 
In his recent analytical work, Spáč looked systematically at the 
selection procedures of new judges under the formally independent 
judiciary system in Slovakia. Unsurprisingly, the analysis showed 
strong tendency of the judiciary to favor like-minded candidates for the 
office.226 In fact, “the statistical analysis clearly demonstrated that 
candidates with higher social and cultural capital – hence those who 
either knew someone in the committee or had a relative who was a 
judge, were preferred.”227 Moreover, “these candidates were more 
likely to succeed in each part of the process.”228 
[T]he research showed that judge-dominated selection process of 
new judges does not produce selection based on merit, but in 
bureaucratic judiciaries with bureaucratic and corporatist attitudes 
prefers such candidates that are likely to protect the status quo. A 
system which such a selection produces creates networks of 
gratitude and loyalty where less experienced judges can be 
considerably controlled by senior judges or judges higher in the 
hierarchy in such a way that could pose a substantial threat to 
output independence. This particularly applies to judiciaries where 
non- democratic legacies are still present and where judges served 
regimes and were willing to implement laws in such a way that 
conformed with preferences of ruling elites. Finally, judge-
dominated models of judicial selection are likely to create a 
situation where judiciary may protect itself from effective 
accountability, where it will be perceived as not independent, and 
where judges will be willing to abuse their powers to foster their 
interests – whatever they may be.229 
As Bobek and Kosař noticed, the model pressed on CEE entrants 
to the European Union most resembles the Italian model—Consiglio 
Superiore della Magistratura.230 On the one hand, it is one of the oldest 
Councils for Judiciary in Europe, but it is also often criticized for lack 
 
225.  Bostjan Zalar, From ‘Communist Legacy’ to Capacity Building to Better Manage the 
Rule of Law, in CENTRAL EUROPEAN JUDGES UNDER THE INFLUENCE: TRANSFORMATIVE 
POWER OF THE EU REVISITED 149, 156 (Michal Bobek ed., 2015). 
226.  Spáč, supra note 10, at 131, et passim. 
227.  Spáč, supra note 105, at 131.  
228.  Id. 
229.  Id.  
230.  Michal Bobek & David Kosař, Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study 
in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe, 15 GER. L.J. NO. 7, 1270 (2014). 
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of accountability and low efficiency.231 It is a model that is focused on 
strict detachment from other branches of government,232 but inside the 
judiciary it is uncertain whether it could save the judiciary from 
dictatorship or oligarchization. 
The concept of judicial independence has been misused and 
abused by some parts of the judiciary who shielded their often 
unethical, unlawful or status-quo-defending behavior with a cloak of 
the independence. 
Judicial independence has been used, for instance, to explain why 
to disregard established case law of higher courts and thus render 
the judicial process almost unpredictable; why not to display the 
full name of deciding judges in published decision of the court; 
why it is impossible for judges to regularly publish their assets and 
incomes; why there cannot be any legal obligation for judges to 
follow continuous education after their appointment; or why only 
judges have to keep 13th and 14th salaries when the government 
is trying to push through cuts in public savings. . .233 
This abuse of the argument of independence went so far, that 
when judges needed help from media and public to save their 
independence, there was nobody who stood up to protect them.234 
For a long time, independence as a value was in the limelight, but 
recently the consequences of too much of independence have been 
admitted.235 It is much easier to ask for institutional independence, than 
 
231.  See CARLO GAUNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI, THE POWER OF JUDGES: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COURTS AND DEMOCRACY 54–59, 174–77 (Cheryl A. Thomas ed., 
2002). 
232.  See id. 
233.  Bobek, supra note 35, at 112-13.  
234.  In 2014, the National Council of Slovak Republic adopted a constitutional 
amendment that allows surveillance of the candidates and judges already on the bench via the 
National Security Office. Judges might not have been aware of this surveillance. CCJE 
concluded that this was a serious breach of the principles of independence of the judiciary and 
separation of powers. However, it must be stressed that the Judicial Council has the final word 
on the evaluation of surveillance. The law was challenged before the Constitutional Court, and 
the case is pending. Radka Minarechová , New security clearances for judges implemented, Za 
Otvorenu Justiciú (Oct. 2, 2015, 06:30 P.M.), http://www.sudcovia.sk/en/documents/38-
external/1969-new-security-clearances-for-judges-implemented [https://perma.cc/Q8JZ-JJZ9].  
235.  Compare COMM. OF MINISTERS, Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Comm. of 
Ministers to Member States on the Independence, Efficiency, and Role of Judges, and Opinion 
no. 1 with CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN JUDGES (CCJE], Magna Carta of Judges 
(Nov. 17, 2010) (setting independence, liability, and remuneration, etc. as priorities). Later, 
more recent documents of CCJE and CEPEJ put accountability and transparency forward. 
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to ask for ethical self-reflection, respecting of code of ethics, 
transparency and controlling system of the competence of the judges. 
Yet, based on the case-study of post-communist transition of judiciary 
in Slovakia and other CEE countries we can conclude that self-
administration and independence should be given to judges after their 
competency and accountability is proved. It is difficult to expect self-
reflection after the period, when justice has been abused as an everyday 
routine as Leah Wortham mentioned: “How do you create respect for 
the rule of law where the honorable thing to do, in some countries, was 
to avoid the law?” 236 
Euro-model does not consider specifics of every system. Every 
country has specific system of checks and balances, depending on how 
much power is situated in whose hands. This process has been 
developing for decades and still is not over. After that, a model policy 
could be harmful for emerging democracies that do not have a tradition 
of self-administration of judiciary, that would be accountable to a well-
developed civil society. In some ways over-reacting to concerns about 
the obvious lack of judicial independence in communist times, the 
European Union pressed systems on the new members that over-
emphasized judicial independence. The unfortunate consequences are 
systems that operate with too little judicial accountability, shielding 
judicial leadership and local judges alike from scrutiny, a condition that 
is conducive to corruption. In addition, the EU-pressed systems, while 
creating excessive insulation for judges from state actors, did nothing 
to discourage control of local judges by judge-superiors such as court 
presidents. So while local judges may be well-insulated from 
interference from elected state actors, the same system opens them to 
interference by court presidents who control significant parts of the 
local judge’s existence. 
 
Notice that Recommendation no. R (94) 12, and the European Charter on the Statute for Judges 
do not mention transparency at all. COMM. OF MINISTERS, Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of 
the Comm. of Ministers to Member States on the Independence, Efficiency, and Role of Judges 
(Oct. 13, 1994),  https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/
DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016804c84e2 [https://perma.cc/J82G-ZN4G]; 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, European Charter on the Statute for Judges (July 10, 1998), 
https://rm.coe.int/16807473ef [https://perma.cc/2PTG-WF8J]. 
236.  Aubrey McCutcheon, Eastern Europe: Funding Strategies for Public Interest Law in 
Transitional Societies, in MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE 233, 235 (Mary McClymount & Stephen 
Golub eds., 2000). 
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A.   Liability and Accountability: Unexplained Difference in CEE 
Judiciary 
A problem of adopting the right ratio of independence and 
accountability lies often in the perception of ethical and legal duties, 
therefore in understanding what the difference between accountability 
and liability really is. As we mentioned when discussing the history of 
CEE countries, the perception of the importance of ethical principles is 
very low. It became more than clear for politicians, public figures, as 
well as for ordinary inhabitants, that only the law has that miraculous 
power of enforcement. For the last seventy years, forty years of the 
authoritarian regime and another almost thirty years of transition, 
traditional normative systems such as morality and ethics have been 
neglected and forgotten somewhere in the background. They did not, 
and could not have, reemerged as a simple result of granting 
independence to the judiciary. 
The judiciary is no different from the rest of the country. As Jiří 
Příbáň mentioned regarding the Czech judiciary: 
moral dimension of personal independence is somehow 
problematic. . . . Czech judges tend to mistake moral and ethical 
behaviour for legality. The popular perception is that as long as no 
legal provision is violated, the behavior is “moral”. This problem 
is then multiplied by lacking peer pressure and censure and 
deficient sanction mechanism. . . .237 
Michal Bobek also points out a very narrow understanding of the 
ethical scope of independence and accountability in the CEE countries. 
Often, the CEE idea of the independence was the right to a lawful 
judge.  
This right is a typical post-totalitarian reaction device, which was 
introduced to avoid any (further) political manipulation in the 
allocation of cases and the assignment of certain cases to 
politically “conscious” judges. The “reply character” of this 
constitutional right determines its geographical application: 
having German origins, the right to a lawful judge was, after the 
fall of Communism, taken on into quite a few of the Central and 
Eastern European constitutions. We do not find any similar 
 
237.  Bobek, supra note 15, at 110 (citing Jiří Přibáň, Independence as a Value of Legal 
Thinking, Address at the Conference on Judicial Independence by the Czech Bar Association, 
(Oct. 20, 2006)).” 
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principle in countries with no or minimal totalitarian experience, 
typically the United Kingdom.238 
Unlike their position at the time of accession, the Council of 
Europe and the European Union have finally noticed this problem and 
started to recognize the importance of accountability as a counterpart 
of independence in their documents.239 These documents summarize 
the principles of ethics of a judge that represent an accountability of the 
judge.240 ENCJ recently states: 
Independence and accountability go together: accountability is a 
prerequisite for independence. Independence is granted by society. 
A Judiciary that does not want to be accountable to society and has 
no eye for societal needs will not gain the trust of society and will 
endanger its independence in the short or long run. Accountability 
without independence reduces the Judiciary to a government 
agency.241 
The need for codification is a characteristic feature of the 
continental legal culture.242 Every rule that is binding, is expected to be 
laid down in writing. Codes of ethics and codes of professional conduct 
have started to be very important instruments in thriving for excellence 
in professions, including the judiciary. The goal of such principles in 
a code is to perfectly express the quintessence of certain activity. CEE 
countries lag in the proper observance and enforcement of these 
principles.243 
Confusion comes from the existence of different levels of 
normative rules with different consequences, if violated. In addition to 
the legal framework that limits action, there are disciplinary and ethical 
boundaries as well. CCJE strictly distinguishes among three types of 
rules: statutory rules, disciplinary rules, and standards of professional 
conduct.244 
 
238.  Id. at 111-12.  
239.  See Opinion No. 3, CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN JUDGES (Nov. 19, 
2002), https://rm.coe.int/16807475bb [https://perma.cc/PKJ5-R9K7]; see also EUROPEAN 
NETWORK OF COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY, COUNCILS FOR THE JUDICIARY REPORT 2016-
2017 INTRODUCTION (2017) [hereinafter ENCJ]. 
240.  Id. 
241.  See ENCJ, supra note 239.  
242.  CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN JUDGES, supra note 210, at ¶ 41. 
243.  See ENCJ, supra note 237.  
244.  Id. at ¶ 45. 
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Standards of professional conduct are different from statutory and 
disciplinary rules. They express the profession’s ability to reflect 
its function in values matching public expectations by way of 
counterpart to the powers conferred on it. These are self-regulatory 
standards which involve recognizing that the application of the law 
is not a mechanical exercise, involves real discretionary power and 
places judges in a relationship of responsibility to themselves and 
to citizens.245 
Furthermore, CCJE admits the danger of ambiguous 
interpretation of vague ethical principles.246 Moreover, it is aware of 
the fact that without discussion about the essence of the principles their 
application might be too rigid.247  In that context it suggests to speak of 
“statement of standards of professional conduct,” rather than of “a 
code”.248 
The disturbing circumstance in CEE countries is quite the 
opposite. Accountability is not confused with criminal, civil or 
disciplinary liability. On the contrary, there is a common bias against 
any other responsibility other than legal or disciplinary liability. It 
could be said—what is not illegal cannot be wrong. 
So where is accountability? Just like independence is not intended 
to serve the judge, but is a right of individuals towards the government, 
in the same way, the accountability is owed to public by judges, as the 
proof that they do not abuse their independence. Accountability has two 
perspectives. First, it obliges from inside: for a judge, it motivates her 
to stand by ethical principles that are essential for the vocation.249 One 
of the best instruments to secure accountability of the judge is an 
established, effective and respected code of professional conduct. It 
signals outward, for the public, the values endorsed by the judiciary 
and communicates what people can expect from an honorable judge. It 
also binds inward and sets the list of the values of the vocation for the 
judge herself. The way a judge is supposed to present her good will and 
devotion to fundamental principles of the judiciary is in the opinion 
that she provides in decision and reasoning she applies. These two are 
essential and crucial instruments of securing accountability. 
 
245.  Id. at ¶ 45. 
246.  Id. at ¶ 46. 
247.  Id. 
248.  Id. 
249.  CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN JUDGES, supra note 210, at ¶ 50 
(summarizing those principles of conduct). 
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The CEE approach to rules is a never-ending story of textualist 
and formalist approaches, that disables the application of these 
principles to advance administration of the judiciary, to raise the trust 
of the judiciary among public and to build on integrity and quintessence 
of the judiciary: a judiciary that is both accountable and independent. 
Independence without accountability poses serious problems. It is 
an unstable model because it insulates judicial acts of greed and 
corruption from examination. It risks destruction of transparency of 
judicial decision-making.250 For example, Romania has a completely 
autonomous judiciary.251 It is controlled by a judicial council with 
nineteen members.252 Four of these members are appointed with some 
influence by the Senate while the other fifteen are magistrates 
appointed exclusively by the judicial council.253 Discipline of judges is 
done exclusively by the judicial council. This configuration makes the 
judiciary completely isolated from the executive and legislative 
branches.254 As a result, Romania has been repeatedly reprimanded by 
the European Commission for the judiciary’s lack of transparency and 
accountability.255 It has come to the point that “‘while judges may see 
the Council as a body responsive to those who elected them, the 
Council no longer sees its position as being judges’ representative but 
as one who owns the judiciary . . . .”256 Therefore, problems with 
accountability, impartiality, and transparency persist. 
And Slovakia has struggled with a prolonged period of judicial 
domination by one man and his comrades, Štefan Harabin. In 2014, 
Harabin was rejected in his re-election efforts for both President of the 
Supreme Court and Chair of the Judicial Council, marking some 
progress.257 Nonetheless, his influence runs deep into the judiciary, and 
he remains on the Supreme Court with life tenure, so his period of 
domination may have diminished but is not yet closed.258 The media 
and NGOs report highly questionable judicial conduct, most of which 
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was made possible by too great a level of judicial independence and too 
low a level of accountability and transparency. 259 Harabin had moved 
from the Supreme Court in mid-2006 to become the Minister of Justice 
only to arrange reforms transferring competences from the ministry on 
the Judicial Council.260 Upon leaving the Ministry in 2009, he got 
elected to become the chief justice of the Supreme Court, who was at 
the same time chairman of the Judicial Council, finalizing his massive 
conflict of interests. This controversial figure dominated the Slovak 
judiciary for years through some of the following means: (i) initiating 
of disciplinary motion against judges acting contrary to his interests; 
(ii) using harsh sanctions against his opponents, such as removal of 
judges from their office or imposing salary reductions; (iii) influencing 
of nomination of the Judicial Council members and regional court 
presidents; (iv) misusing the hierarchical structure of the judiciary and 
his powers as the chief justice of the highest court (Supreme Court) to 
provide extraordinary remuneration to judges favoring his interests, 
manipulate the allocation of cases, or influencing of particular decision 
making of other judges; (v) deploying harassing libel cases against 
media criticizing his actions; and (vi) facilitating nepotism in judges 
selection procedures.261 These actions eventually mounted up to the 
point where the judiciary was completely hijacked by the interests of 
the few powerful actors within the judiciary and their web of judges 
who owed their positions to the few powerful actors. 
As will be shown, Harabin consolidated his power when he, one, 
deployed harassing disciplinary motions against dissenters, and two, 
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manipulated so called anti-discrimination claims of judges against the 
state.262 In these ways and many others, judges (supported by Harabin 
in his position of minister of justice and later in the position of the 
president of the Supreme Court and the president of the Judicial 
Council) promoted their own final interest while misinterpreting the 
concept of independence. Alternatively, all of this might be simply be 
understood as a clear example of internal corruption within the 
judiciary, made easier by the high level of judicial independence and 
absence of meaningful accountability. 
The state of judiciary in Slovakia attracted wide public attention 
around 2009 when more than 100 judges signed the document called 
‘Five Sentences’.263 They stressed the importance of freedom of 
expression even within judiciary, and they claimed that the fear that 
existed and spread within the judiciary harmed discussion about the 
state of judiciary and the reasons for the public’s low trust in it.264 This 
petition was a reaction to disciplinary motions initiated against those 
dissented against Harabin’s judiciary. The first wave of motions 
included, for example, the case of Judge Darina Kuchtová (initiated by 
Štefan Harabin while still Minister of Justice) who was accused of 
infringing the respect for the function of the judge and detracting from 
the dignity of the judge’s office because she had served as a witness in 
a criminal libel action filed by another judge (Pavol Polka), expressing 
her opinion on the judge’s character.265 She stated that she only 
responded to the questions of the court and that there was no legal basis 
for her not to serve as witness.266 She was never accused to provide 
false testimony. The disciplinary senate of the first instance found her 
guilty in 2009.267 
Another case is related to the motion against a former Judge Jana 
Dubovcová who signed a petition on the website of a reputable 
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watchdog organization that asked the Judicial Council not to elect 
Štefan Harabin for the position of the president of the Supreme Court 
and the chairman of the Judicial Council.268 She allegedly diminished 
trust in the judiciary, infringed the respect for the function of the judge 
and detracted from the dignity of the judge’s office.269 The sanction 
asked for was removal from the office.270 Her office was terminated by 
the decision of the Minister of Justice (Viera Petriková, who became 
the minister after Harabin) but the motion was withdrawn shortly after 
the case became public and “Five sentences” were published.271 
The third case featured a disciplinary motion filed by Štefan 
Harabin as the President of the Supreme Court against the judge of the 
Supreme Court and dissenter, Miroslav Gavalec. Gavalec wrote a letter 
to the Health Care Surveillance Authority (“HCSA”) with a request to 
evaluate the health conditions at the work place, the Supreme Court 
building. However, the HCSA had no jurisdiction over this matter. 
Because the HCSA lacked jurisdiction, Harabin claimed that Miroslav 
Gavalec had violated his duty to continual education and that he 
diminished the public trust in the judiciary as he did not address his 
motion to the competent authority.272 
In 2015, Štefan Harabin spoke of the new president of the 
Supreme Court as somebody who was controlled only by the public 
opinion and politicians. He also said: “She is in a way lamentable lady. 
I tell you, in a short time she can end up in the mental hospital. And 
they will blame me. But it is not my fault.”273 The disciplinary senate 
in the first instance (the case is still pending) decided that Harabin did 
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not violate the rules of ethics because the subjective mens rea was 
missing: he did not intend to diminish trust in judiciary.274 Standards 
of evaluation of unethical behavior in disciplinary senates are somehow 
twisted. 
B. Anti-discrimination Cases Against State 
The problematic understanding of judicial independence as 
judicial autonomy lead to the judicial corporativism in the case of the 
so-called judicial anti-discrimination claims. 
The story begins with the establishment of the Special Court in 
Slovakia in 2004.275 The original act that established the Special Court 
guaranteed significantly higher salary to the judges of the Court 
because they had to fulfill special requirements and there were risks 
connected with their function of ruling on corruption cases.276 The 
salary was later tripled as there were long-term vacancies on the 
Court.277 
The law on the Special Court was later challenged before the 
Constitutional Court, based on the difference in the salary of judges of 
Special Court and other judges.278 The Constitutional Court did not 
perform the regular test of proportionality, and simply stated that the 
difference in salaries is obviously disproportionate.279 A minority of 
Constitutional Court judges had differing opinions.280 
Shortly after the verdict of the Constitutional Court in May 2009, 
the judges of general courts started to file anti-discrimination claims 
based on the Act on Antidiscrimination. The judges calculated how 
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much they would earn being judges of the Special Court and considered 
it to be non-pecuniary damage. Almost two-thirds of judges filed such 
action against the Slovak Republic.281 As it was later found by the 
chamber of the Constitutional Court, the claims were mostly either 
similar or practically identical with repeated grammar mistakes from 
claim to claim, indicating that these actions had been organized.282 
Moreover, those mass claims were decided by the judges who 
themselves filed such actions.283 The judges mostly denied that they 
might not be impartial. This legal opinion was discussed. The position 
that they are indeed impartial prevailed at the Supreme Court.284 This 
practice was eventually stopped by the decision of the Constitutional 
Court. The senate of the Constitutional Court stated that because the 
claims were either similar or the same, the judges who claimed 
discrimination would materially decide their own matter.285 Because 
“if the judge believes in her claim and we cannot reasonably assume 
otherwise, it is hardly believable, ‘here and now’ practically 
unbelievable, that she would decide the same matter of her colleague 
differently.”286 The Supreme Court, whose President was Harabin and 
some of whose members had joined in the claims, in a majority of the 
senates (panels of judges within the Supreme Court) ruled that there 
was no impartiality problem for a judge who had filed a claim to rule 
on another judge’s identical claim: the filing of the claim, the Court 
said, was merely the expression of a legal opinion.287 But the 
Constitutional Court ruled that filing the lawsuit is not a mere 
expression of the abstract legal opinion that might not harm the 
impartiality, but was a concrete opinion with a preconceived idea.288 
Besides that, the Supreme Court and Judicial Council actively 
supported such actions and the Supreme Court even tried to “fix” the 
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difference in salaries on the Supreme Court by bending the law through 
changes in the work schedule of the court. This led to the 
unconstitutional assignment of cases connected with these lawsuits.289 
When in 2011 Łukasz Bojarski and Werner Stemker Köster issued 
the report on the Slovak judiciary prepared for the Open Society 
Foundation, they stated concerning the anti-discrimination claims the 
following: 
The public discussions about salaries, wage discrimination cases 
and bonuses have greatly undermined the authority of and respect 
for the Slovak judiciary. The general belief that judges enrich 
themselves is fueled by the opinion of the politicians. However, 
most shocking is the evident lack of professional ethics as far as 
the wage discrimination cases and the bonuses are concerned. As 
for the former: it should be obvious for any judge that such a claim 
should preferably never be dealt with in court and if so, may never 
be judged by a judge who has a similar claim pending.290 
Besides the lack of professional ethics, judges at the time showed 
widespread insensitivity, or perhaps the lack of social responsibility, 
towards the economic situation in the Slovak Republic within the 
context of the recent economic crisis, which probably added to the 
negative public view towards the judiciary. In this instance, concepts 
of independence and impartiality were bent by the judges in their 
personal favor.291 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Judicial independence is a term with many meanings and 
applications but a singular aura. The reality is that judicial 
 
289.  Moreover, in 2010 the Judicial Council presided by Judge Harabin adopted the 
resolution no. 1099 in which it commented on the legal basis of the anti-discrimination claims, 
explicitly stating that there is existing discrimination and that judges should be awarded 
pecuniary satisfaction. See Resolution no. 1099, THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL, (Dec. 13, 2010), 
http://www.sudnarada.gov.sk/antidiskriminacne-zaloby-sudcov/ [https://perma.cc/KZQ3-
JJEN]. On January 2011, the Plenary meeting of the Supreme Court adopted the memorandum, 
proposed by Mr. Harabin, which had the same spirit as the resolution of the Judicial Council. 
Only a few judges of the Supreme Court protested and left the meeting while pointing to the fact 
that the judges of the Supreme Court just expressed their opinion on the substance of the pending 
cases. 
290.  Bojarski & Köster, supra note 224, at 111–12. 
291.  See id. at 110-12.   
548 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:2 
independence is but one means toward the truly crucial end of judicial 
impartiality. But judicial independence is not an absolute and must be 
balanced by appropriate levels of judicial accountability and 
transparency. Judicial independence in the United States is not doled 
out in equal portions among federal Article III judges (the most 
independent structurally) to state court judges to federal and state 
administrative law judges, who are not meant to be independent in the 
most accurate sense of the term at all.292 
An analysis of judicial independence in Europe makes clear that 
judicial independence is not a static concept and is expressed 
differently in each European state.293 In Western Europe and among 
member states of the European Union, the concept of judicial 
independence has had a relatively long time to mature. Western 
European states appear to have reached a certain comfort point where 
the judicial independence of judges is not threatened.294 However, 
these states still face the challenges that come with maintaining an 
independent judiciary, including deciding the proper balance between 
independence and accountability. 
In contrast, the precise concept of judicial independence in CEE 
states has not yet been established. States in these regions not only have 
to establish the judiciary as an independent body for the first time but 
also work to separate their states from their troubling pasts. Previously 
communist states try to foster public support in order to establish a 
more independent judiciary from citizens who perceive the judiciary as 
a corrupt arm of an oppressive executive branch. However, these states 
should not be discouraged. Many Western states have slowly 
established healthy, independent judiciaries in the wake of previous 
rule by oppressive regimes. A key goal of these states must be to 
balance judicial independence with appropriate measures of 
accountability and transparency with a clear understanding that judicial 
independence must prevent the government from influencing judicial 
decision-making in actual cases, without preventing appropriate 
inquiries by the government into judicial spending and operations and 
appointments. 
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Individual countries necessarily require individual approach and 
assessment of robustness of their institutions. Institutions, often taking 
decades or even centuries to build, achieve high degrees of resilience 
through sustained practice.295 Only then, can stable institutions emerge 
and develop their regulative and normative qualities. A giant leap in 
structural setup of the judiciary, budget allocations, as well as shifts of 
mindset were expected from the CEE candidate member states. Well-
meaning recommendations of the European Union, combined with 
Council of Europe’s advice, represented an institutional overhaul for 
candidate states, conditioned not by the recognition of necessity to put 
one’s own house into order, but by financial and political motivations 
of states to gain the Union’s and Council’s acclamation. This 
conditionality in some instances triggered speedy procedures to adopt 
reforms without proper internal discussion and considerations, almost 
to the point of undermining other principles the European Union was 
set to encourage and develop, such as due legislative procedures, based 
on open public discourse. The tendency to speed up reform proposals 
was unsurprisingly even stronger in countries, which were laggards in 
the accession process, such as Slovakia, which suffered from a 
democracy deficit between 1994-98, as these countries needed to catch 
up and felt they had had to prove themselves. Moreover, it can also be 
reasonably expected that these countries would opt for rather visible, 
even radical reforms in order to seek legitimacy and endorsement from 
the European Union.296 However, such legal transplants may not turn 
out to be successful. 
The excessive independence, unbalanced by accountability, 
created an environment in which corruption could thrive, largely 
unseen and unchecked. Judicial power was consolidated in few hands, 
and these hands were essentially the same as in the prior regime. The 
relatively sudden opportunity to control the judiciary was seized upon 
and used for personal gain and stockpiling of power. 
While the formal transition from a judiciary dependent on the state 
to one that must be independent of its actors occurred, the mental 
transition of the judges has not occurred. With many notable exceptions 
of courageous, public-minded judges, the judiciary as a whole has still 
not made the transition to one that is worthy of so much independence 
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and self-governance. This should not be surprising to the European 
Union, but it was plainly not considered at the time of accession. 
Instead, the policy chosen was to reform structures ensuring 
independence without simultaneously ensuring a judiciary staffed with 
judges who were worthy of such trust. The result has been a judiciary 
that is correctly mistrusted by the public, and all the consequent harms 
to the Slovak people that result from a judiciary unworthy of public 
trust. 
The recent alarming events in Poland should give pause to states 
such as Slovakia, Czech Republic, Croatia, Montenegro, and perhaps 
later, Ukraine, Serbia, and Kosovo. The current Polish situation finds a 
populist party (“PiS”) in control of the government, acting, and 
threatening to act further to destroy judicial independence in Poland. 
The actions of PiS have a surface legitimacy that is created by the 
undue level of judicial independence, lack of accountability, and 
internal corruption that mark not only the Polish judiciary but also other 
judiciaries in the region. The Polish government can explain to the 
public that the judges are out of control, have no oversight, and have 
embraced corrupt practices as a result. These arguments are currently 
being made to justify a move toward government take-over of the 
judiciary, a move that threatens to return Poland to the absence of 
judicial independence that marked the communist times and that still 
exists, for example, in China.297 
The public, if not the European Union itself, have been accepting 
of these Polish government justifications for taking control over the 
judiciary. The recent proposal by the European Commission to the 
Council to adopt a decision under Article 7 of the Treaty on European 
Union, the first in the history of the European Union,298 should not be 
understood as an effort to retain the Polish judiciary as it currently 
exists, but instead should be used as an opportunity to reform the Polish 
judiciary, retaining the right measure of judicial independence while 
adding judicial accountability and controls over the conduct of judicial 
superiors such as court presidents. 
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States such as Slovakia should recognize the narrow window of 
opportunity that remains to get its judicial house in order before 
conditions that have produced the Polish situation materialize. No 
judicial independence is an untenable position for a democracy. Too 
much independence can lead to none, as current events in Poland make 
clear. 
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